CHINNA THIMMAPPA Vs. TALUKUNTA TIMMAPPA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The question referred to the Full Bench in this case relates to the construction of Section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code, that is, whether the words "any such statement" in the first paragraph of Clause (1) of the section cover only written statements or oral statements as well. The section has been the subject of consideration in a Full Bench decision of the High Court at Rangoon reported in King-Emperor V/s. Maung Tha Din (1926) I.L.R. 4 R. 72 (F.B.). One may begin the consideration of the section by assuming that, at first sight, two different constructions are possible. The two possible constructions are stated by Rutledge, C.J., at page 80. They are (1) a statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of an investigation under Chapter XIV, and (2) a statement made to a police officer in the course of an investigation under Chapter XIV and reduced into writing. The difference between the two meanings consists in that the second meaning contains an additional qualification, namely "being reduced into writing." The question is, which of these is to be adopted?

(2.) The pronominal use of the word "such" is a very common expedient in legislation to avoid repetition of a long descriptive phrase or clause used earlier. We have to ascertain what are the words the repetition of which is intended to be avoided by the use of the word "such". The phrase "such statement" is intended to avoid a repetition of the statement already described. What are the words descriptive of the statement already used? The words are, "made by any person to a police officer in the course of an investigation under this Chapter". These are the only words descriptive of the word "statement" earlier in the section, and presumably it is to avoid the repetition of such description that the word "such" is used in the next clause. The words "reduced into writing" are not parts of the description of the word "statement" in the opening clause. If the word "such" is intended to cover also the words "reduced into writing" the earlier part of the section would have run as follows: No statement made by any person to a police officer in the course of an investigation under this Chapter and reduced into writing shall. . . .

(3.) The legislature has instead of using this form deliberately avoided it and chosen to introduce the words "reduced into writing" into a conditional clause qualifying the verb "shall be signed" and not into a clause descriptive of the word "statement". It seems to me therefore that, looking at the grammatical form chosen by the legislature, the supposed ambiguity vanishes and the clause is capable of only one meaning, namely, the first of the two mentioned. This conclusion is strengthened by the phrase "or any record thereof" as pointed out by Rutledge, C. J., in the case already quoted and by the learned Chief Justice in the referring judgment. The opposite conclusion was arrived at by Wallace and Madhavan Nair, JJ., in the decision in Venkata-subbiah V/s. King-Emperor (1924) I.L.R. 48 M. 640 : 48 M.L.J. 195. One of the considerations which weighed with our brother Wallace, J., in that decision was that the provisos refer only to written statements. In the first proviso the words "such writing" make the matter clear beyond any ambiguity and the words "such statement" used further on in the proviso and in the second proviso obviously could refer only to written statements. But it does not follow that, because the provisos clearly refer only to written statements, the main paragraph of Section (1) may not be wide enough to cover both oral and written statements. Another argument relied on by Wallace, J., has reference to Section 27 of the Evidence Act. He thought that, if Section 162 includes also oral statements, then the information given by the accused in custody to a police officer leading to the discovery of some fact would be inadmissible under Section 162. But it has always been held to be admissible under Section 27 read as a proviso to Section 25 of the Evidence Act. This is one of the points considered by the decision in Rangoon above referred to and it was there held that Section 27 is not controlled by Section 162. It is not one of the points referred to us; but we have got to deal with it as an argument relied on by Wallace, J., in Venkatasubbiah V/s. King-Emperor (1924) I.L.R. 48 M. 640 : 48 M.L.J. 195. It seems to me that Section 162 relates generally to the admissibility of statements and it says that statements described in that section are inadmissible. Section 27 relates to a more particular matter. It creates an exception to the general inadmissibility of statements made to a police officer, namely, where the statement consists of information received from the accused in custody in consequence of which a certain fact is discovered. On the principle that a general rule is affected by a special rule and not the special by the general rule, I am of opinion that Section 27 is not affected by Section 162 of the Criminal Procedure Code, but Section 162 (Cr. P. C.) is affected by Section 27 of the Evidence Act. The result is not that the construction of Section 162 which I indicated above cannot stand but that a special exception to it exists in the circumstances mentioned in Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act. In cases not covered by the exception Section 162 as interpreted by me above continues to operate. The view indicated above is also the view taken in all the other High Courts besides Rangoon. Vide Labh Singh V/s. The Crown (1924) I.L.R. 6 Lah. 24, Rakha V/s. The Crown (1925) I.L.R. 6 Lah. 171, Bahadur Singh V/s. The Crown (1926) I.L.R. 7 Lah. 264, Emperor V/s. Vithu Balu Kharat and Azimuddy V/s. Emperor (1926) I.L.R. 54 C. 237.