G. I. P. RY Vs. HARAKCHAND HEMCHAND

JUDGEMENT

(1.) . 1. This is an application for review of my decision. The learned counsel for the applicant has in a very long and elaborate argument tried to urge that the view taken by me in the case as. regards the obligation of the Kailway Company to reweigh is opposed to that taken by the Judges of the Calcutta High Court in Janki Das v. B. N. Ry. Co. [1912] 16 G. W. N. 356 and Ram Jas Agarwal v. Indian General Navigation & Ry. Co. Ltd. [1918] 22 C. W.N. 310 and. Jagannath Marwary v. R. I. Ry. Co. [1918] 22 C. W. N. 902 and that I should not have preferred the view expressed in R. and K. Ry. Co. v. Ismail Khan [1915] 13 A. L.J. 417, by the Judges of the Allahabad High Court, to their view. In other words the review is sought on the short ground that there is an error of law in my decision. But as held by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Chha juram v. Neki A.I.R. 1922 P.C. 112, the mere fact that a judgment proceeded upon an incorrect, exposition of the law is no valid ground for review. This view has been followed by this Court in Ramchandra v. Govindrao A.I.R. 1925. Nag. 266, where it is distinctly pointed out that a mistake of law is not in itself a sufficient mistake or error apparent on the face of the record to warrant a review of judgment. Even assuming that there is an error or mistake of law in the decision under review, I think I, as a single Judge, am bound by the Bench decision of this Court especially as it is based on the Privy Council decision just quoted above. I am therefore, constrained to reject the petition for review on this technical ground.

(2.) LASTLY , I am asked to hold that some of my remarks as regards the scheme and intention of the Railways Act are mere obiter and unnecessary for the actual decision of the case This may be so, I may say it is natural in a judgment which was somewhat long. But the correctness or otherwise of this remark; of the applicant must depend upon the actual observations made, or upon the construction of word that may have been, used or might have crept in the course of writing a decision. If the observations were unnecessary, as the company thinks, for supporting the actual finding or decision given in the case and it could be otherwise supported on the evidence on record, then the Railway Company is at perfect liberty to ignore my obiter remarks, without the necessity of asking for a review of my decision and obtaining a pronouncement to that effect from me. All that I can say, for the benefit of the Railway Company, if it benefits the company at all, is that on the facts and circumstances which were proved in the case, the refusal and neglect of the Railway Company to comply with the plaintiffs demand for reweighment was prompted by improper motives and was not justified. It was, therefore, actionable in the circumstances of the ease. It was far from my intention to lay down as a matter of abstract proposition of law that the Railway Company was under a legal obligation under all circumstances, to reweigh the goods at the sweet will of a customer. If there was any generalization and reference to the provisions of the Railways Act, the same must be with the object of lending more support by way of an additional proof rather than as the main stay for the decision, which was arrived at and based by me, on the evidence adduced in the case.