EMPEROR Vs. KUNWAR RANANJAI SINGH OF AMETHI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This case comes before us by way of reference by the District Magistrate. Unfortunately the facts, if they can be dignified by that description, disclose an unparalleled disregard of the principles of proper procedure and an astounding condition of misunderstanding and muddle. No evidence has been taken in the case at all. A plea of "guilty" by a pleader has been recorded to an offence under a section which does not relate to any offence at all, but only to the penalties to be inflicted for of fences under other sections. If the real offence intended to be charged, and intended to be covered by the plea of "guilty" was that which has generally been assumed to be the offence, it is clear that the fine inflicted of Rs. 10 was utterly inadequate. The suggestion on behalf of the defence before us to- day, so far as we can understand it, is that the gentleman summoned is of such social standing and public position that he could not be reasonably expected to attend a Court of justice, engaged in private and public work elsewhere, and so long as the Magistrate was willing to inflict a small fine upon him, it did not matter what he had done or to what he had pleaded guilty. If this is the real state of things, it is a travesty of justice.

(2.) The assumed facts are that a car in which he was sitting, driven by a servant of his, knocked down and killed a boy between Partabgarh and Allahabad, and that in spite of a serious accident of this kind, the gentleman allowed his driver to proceed in the most inhuman way and endeavoured to cover up his tracks and conceal the identity of his car. The answer to this very serious allegation now made before us is that he was not there at all, that he did not hear of the accident until a long time afterwards, and that he pleaded guilty through a pleader either per incuriam, or without knowing what offence he was pleading guilty to. This is obviously a very unsatisfactory state of things. The driver has been identified and tried and convicted for the offence of causing the death of the boy by reckless driving. As his case is under appeal, it is undesirable that we should make further reference to the actual events at the time of the accident, or to the means said to have been taken, either to conceal his identity, or, on the other hand, to establish his identity. These are matters which are sub judice. Nor have we any materials for expressing any opinion as to whether the present defendant to the present summons was in the car or not. One curious feature about the case is that it has been argued before us, on the one hand, by the Assistant Government Advocate representing the Government and, on the other hand, by Mr. Dube representing the accused, without any summons or copy thereof appearing in any shape or form, either on the record, or in the brief of either counsel, and at this moment nobody knows what the summons contained. It must, however, be assumed that everything has proceeded upon the basis of a summons charging the accused with a breach of Section 16, Motor Act, for failing to give notice to the police that the driver had killed a boy. The foregoing passage is extracted from the referring order. Two observations arise upon it. In the first place, there is no such thing as an offence under Section 16, Motor Act, at all and, in the second place, there is no offence, so far as we can discover, in the Motor Vehicles Act, coming within the description given by the Joint Magistrate of failing to give notice to the police that your driver has killed a boy.

(3.) It becomes necessary, therefore, first to refer to the Motor Vehicles Act. Section 16 is a penalty clause and prescribes the penalties which may be inflicted upon anybody who contravenes any of the provisions of the Act or any rule made under the Act. The sooner the authorities abandon the practice of prosecuting motorists, or indeed any other people, under sections which do not prescribe an offence at all, the better. So far as the alleged facts of this case are concerned, one possible section appropriate is Section 4. Section 4 prescribes that when the person in charge of a motor vehicle knows, or has reason to believe, that an accident has occurred, he shall cause the vehicle to stop and shall also, if required, give his name and address and the name and address of the owner of the motor vehicle. If Kunwar Rananjai Singh Sahib was in the car at the time of the accident, that section would apply to him. The language of the section has been carefully chosen. It has occurred, and it may frequently occur, that a driver who has caused an accident either by excessive speed, or by a bona fide mishap, and refuses to stop, may plead, and rightly plead, that he was acting under the orders of either the owner or the gentleman in charge of the car. The owner may be sitting behind giving direct orders to his driver as to the pace at which he is to travel and he may, in spite of a serious accident, command the driver to pursue his way. Similarly, the owner may be absent, and a person may be in charge of the car, with the consent of the owner, such as a member of the household or a guest, who has an important journey to perform and is permitted by the owner to take charge of the car and the driver. In such cases, it is clear that the person in charge of the car, to whose orders the driver is in fact submitting at the time of the accident or immediately thereafter, is amenable to the section. We are informed-we can say no more-that the summons issued against this gentleman had no relation to this section, but that what he was really summoned for was a breach of some motor rule made under the Act, which neither ourselves nor anybody engaged in this case before us, appears to know anything about, which requires a member of the public to give information to the police, if he knows that his driver has caused a serious accident or death. Under what circumstances that obligation is imposed upon him depends upon the terms of the rule of which we are profoundly ignorant, and to which both the Magistrate who tried the case and the Magistrate who has referred it to us, did not condescend to refer. This fact however, raises a question of importance to Magistrates, and of importance to a growing class of the public who use these vehicles upon the high road.