IPPILI RAGHUNADHA PATRO Vs. GOVINDA PATRO (DEAD)

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The question that has been referred to us is as follows: Has the High Court in the exercise of its revisional jurisdiction either under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code or Section 107 of the Government of India Act of 1919 power to revise orders passed by the Board of Revenue under Chapter XI or Section 205 of the Estates Land Act?

(2.) It is admitted that the petitions in which this reference has been made relate only to Section 205 of the Estates Land Act and not to Chapter XI of the same. So far, therefore, as orders passed under the latter are concerned, the question is one of academic importance but it will probably be necessary to deal with it in considering the other portion of the reference. Although this reference deals only with orders passed by the Board of Revenue under the Estates Land Act, a great deal of the argument has been directed to the power of revision passed by the High Court in proceedings generally under the Act, for it is only in three reported cases of this Court that the question of revising an order of the Board of Revenue has arisen, namely, Appanna V/s. Latchayya (1923) I.L.R. 47 M. 250 45 M.L.J. 735, where the learned Judges differed in opinion, Zamindar of Kallikote V/s. Mongolapur (1926) M.W.N. 131 where the Full Bench held that the question need not be decided in those proceedings, and Valluri Narasimha Rao V/s. The Ryots of Peddamamidipalli (1925) I.L.R. 49 M. 499 : (1926) M.W.N. 131, where Devadoss and Waller, JJ., held that the High Court had such jurisdiction. It is sought to establish the jurisdiction of this Court on two grounds, (1) the powers of the Court under Section 107 of the Government of India Act and Section 16 of the Letters Patent, and (2) the powers under Section 115 of the Civil Procedure Code. So far as proceedings before a Collector are concerned, it was held in Paramaswami Aiyangar V/s. Alamelu Nachiar Ammal (1918) I.L.R. 42 M. 76 : 35 M.L.J. 500 (F.B.) that the High Court was competent to revise an order passed by a Collector under Section 35 of the Estates Land Act. Ayling, J., held that an order under Section 35 was not an order contemplated by Section 205 and that therefore revision lay to the High Court, whereas Krishnan, J., was apparently of the same opinion but also held that there was no reason why the High Court and the Board of Revenue should not have concurrent jurisdiction in revising such proceedings. Again in Ramaswami Goundan (1918) I.L.R. 42 M. 310 : 36 M.L.J. 571 V/s. Kali Goundou1 the same Bench held that the High Court had power to revise an order on an application under Section 131 of the Estates Land Act, an order to which Section 205 was clearly applicable. Ayling, J., in that case agreed with the opinion of Krishnan, J., in the prior case holding that the grant of the power of revision to the High Court under the provisions of Section 192 of the Estates Land Act was not inconsistent with the concurrent jurisdiction of the Collector and the Board of Revenue under Section 205. This latter decision was followed by Kumaraswami Sastri, J., in Gopanna Mannadiar V/s. Palani Goundan (1925) M.W.N. 489 and by Ramesam, J., in Maharaja of Jeypore V/s. Sobha Sundar Dalai , but their judgments do not add anything to the decisions already quoted.

(3.) There is a long series of decisions in the Calcutta High Court, one of the earliest being Gobind Kumar Chowdry V/s. Kisto Coomar Chowdry (1867) 7 W.R. 520 (F.B.) in which it was held that the High Court has revisional jurisdiction over the rent Courts under Bengal Act X of 1859, and this was affirmed by the Privy Council in Nilmoni Singh Deo V/s. Taraknath Mukerjee (1882) L.R. 9 I.A. 174 where their Lordships accept without discussion the rinding of the Calcutta High Court that it had jurisdiction. This view was also taken in Chaitan Patgosi Mahapatra V/s. Kunja Behari Patnaik (1911) I.L.R. 38 C. 832, but all these cases can, I think, be differentiated. When the High Court Charter Act was passed, the Bengal Act X of 1859 was in force and the Saddar Court had jurisdiction over these Revenue Courts. The jurisdiction of the Saddar Court was passed on unchanged to the High Court and it is apparently on that ground that the Calcutta High Court has always assumed revisional jurisdiction in these revenue proceedings. This was not the basis of the decision in Kartik Chdndra Ogha V/s. Gora Chand Marto (1913) I.L.R. 40 C. 518, but there it was held that even under the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act VI of 1908 the High Court still possessed jurisdiction on the ground that under Section 224(2) of that Act a second appeal was allowed in certain cases to the High Court and therefore the Courts were subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court. In another case decided in the same year, Uma Charan Mondal V/s. Midnapur Zamindari Co., Ltd. (1914) 18 C.W.N. 782, it was held that the High Court had no power to revise certain proceedings under the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act on the ground that the Revenue Officer was not a Court subordinate to the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court nor subject to its powers of superintendence. In this judgment it was also pointed out that all the cases under Act X of 1859 were clearly distinguishable. With all respect the judgment in this case appears to me to be based on more satisfactory grounds than that in Kartik Chandra Ogha V/s. Gora Chand Marto (1913) I.L.R. 40 C. 518, where the question of whether the Courts were or were not in all respects subject to the appellate jurisdiction of the High Court was not fully discussed. Kartik Chandra Ogha V/s. Gora Chand Marto (1913) I.L.R. 40 C. 518 can also be distinguished in this Court on the ground that the Estates Land Act does not in terms provide for an appeal to the High Court and its appellate jurisdiction can only be invoked under Section 192 which makes certain portions of the Civil Procedure Code applicable. As these Calcutta cases appear to be inapplicable to this Presidency, the question that remain's is whether Valluri Narasimha Rao v. The Ryots of Peddamamidipalli (1914) 18 C.W.N. 782 was rightly decided. The further question of whether Paramaswami Aiyangar V/s. Nachiar Ammal (1925) M.W.N. 489 and Ramaswami Goundan V/s. Kali Goundan (1918) I.L.R. 42 M. 310 M.L.J. 571 were rightly decided does not, strictly speaking, arise for decision.