GOVERNMENT PLEADER Vs. LBBHOPATKAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The facts out of which this application arises are briefly as follows :

(2.) One Mr. Davare was summoned as a witness in the Court of the City Magistrate, Poona. The summons required him to attend at 11 a.m. on May 27, 1927, in order to give evidence in a criminal case. According to Mr. Davare's affidavit in these papers, he attended in obedience to the summons at about five minutes to 11, and ascended the staircase leading to the City Magistrate's Court and was stepping into it, when a policeman, who was doing duty at the head of the staircase, apparently acting under the Magistrate's order rudely prevented him from entering the Court. He says that he waited for about half an hour and then left, as he had business to attend to in the District Court; and that, as soon as that was over, he returned to the City Magistrate's Court at about 2-30 p.m. He then learnt that he had been called at about 12-30 p.m. by the Magistrate, who, finding him absent, had issued a warrant against him. He saw the Magistrate, who had him bound over to appear next day. He appeared accordingly and gave evidence in the case, but on the same day, the Magistrate made a complaint against him under Section 174 of the Indian Penal Code, for having disobeyed the summons by not attending the Court in obedience to it. He was tried for this offence by a Bench of two Magistrates, but was acquitted; and an appeal from that decision was summarily dismissed by this Court. The ground of that decision was that as Mr. Davsre had, in fact, attended the Court and tried to see the Magistrate in order to be excused from waiting and also had returned to the Court, there was no intentional disobedience. The acquittal was on July 4, and on July 20, the opponent, Mr. Bhopatkar, sent a notice to the City Magistrate, who is Mr. Fleming, under Section 80 of the Civil Procedure Code, intimating that unless he paid his client, Mr. Davare, Rs. 1,000 as compensation, his client would be compelled to take such legal steps against him as he might be advised. The application is that the language used in the notice is far too strong, as also unjustifiably and unnecessarily insulting; that it is calculated to bring the administration of justice into contempt and is full of unwarrantable and unfair attack on a judicial officer; and that the conduct of the opponent is, therefore, in excess of the privilege of the Bar and amounts to improper conduct and contempt of Court.

(3.) The learned Advocate General has appeared in support of this application for the exercise of our disciplinary powers under Section 25 of the Bombay Pleaders Act XVII of 1920, while Mr. Coyajee for the opponent has argued that there has been no improper conduct or other reasonable cause for the exorcise of our disciplinary powers. There are one or two minor points which, I think, may first be disposed of.