DEBI DATT TEWARI Vs. EMPEROR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These are two appeals made by one Debi Dat from the order of the learned Sessions Judge of Kumaun refusing to complain against two persons Rudra Dat and Gauri Dat of an offence under Section 193, I.P.C. First of all on the motion of Debi Dat, Rudra Dat and Gauri Dat were prosecuted under Section 477-A of falsification of account, and were acquitted by a Magistrate, Mr. Juyal. The prosecution was not really launched by Mr. Debi Dat, but the opinion of the Magistrate was that he instigated it. Whether he instigated it or not, he gave evidence in the case. The Magistrate while acquitting Rudra Dat and Gauri Dat made very strong comments on the conduct of Debi Dat, and after calling upon him to show cause complained against him for perjury. The perjury trial was held in the Court of the learned Sessions Judge of Kumaun, Mr. Simpson, who came to an entirely contrary conclusion from that arrived at by the Magistrate on the main facts of the falsification of account case and seemed to think that Debi Dat was not a blackguard as held to be by the Magistrate, but was really a public benefactor. Debi Dat was acquitted, and he has now taken up the cycle of cases and applied to the learned Judge for the prosecution of Rudra Dat and Gauri Dat for perjury in the trial in which he himself was acquitted. The learned Judge decided, and I think rightly, that there should be an end to this protracted litigation which began in 1924. It was argued here that the provisions of Section 403, Criminal P.C., do not apply, and that the previous acquittal of Rudra Dat and Gauri Dat does not bar their trial on a charge for giving false evidence subsequent to their acquittal. The learned Judge, however, has not placed his refusal on that basis. The real difficulty is that a third Court may again revert to the opinion of the Magistrate Mr. Juyal, and in that case Rudra Dut and Gauri Dat may again obtain cause for the prosecution of Debi Dat for perjury in a fresh litigation. This would really be a scandal and not a proper administration of justice. Two Courts have taken contradictory views of a particular occurrence, and the matter must rest at that. It will not be advisable in the interests of justice to take further proceedings in the belief that the learned Sessions Judge was correct in his appreciation of evidence, and the Magistrate was wrong. In similar circumstances Tudball, J. made some pertinent observations in Revn. No. 232 of 1917. He said, In any case it is time that a stop should be put to these prosecutions for perjury arising out of this case. Apparently the learned Sessions Judge desires to continue the cycle of cases and if Muazzam Ali Shah be tried by another Judge and per chance be acquitted, then the cycle will continue further and all these witnesses be put again on their trial for perjury and so on ad infinitum. In the circumstances of the case I think it is highly improper to continue these criminal prosecutions.

(2.) There is no such invariable rule that justice must ultimately be done. Cases occur where a matter is left in doubt and real justice is not done. It is inadvisable that in following such a will-o-the-wisp as absolute justice parties should be put to enormous expense and the time of Courts should be wasted.

(3.) I dismiss both the appeals.