SIR TUKOJIRAO HOLKAR Vs. SOWKABAI PANDHARINATH RAJAPURKAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal arises out of a suit brought by a lady in Bombay, by name Sowkabai, against the Ex-Maharaja of the State of Indore. The plaint certainly makes serious allegations against the defendant. It alleges, in brief, that she and her daughter were kept mistresses of a cousin of the defendant and were decoyed from Bombay to Indore under the orders of the defendant in 1915. The defendant is there alleged to have made an indecent proposal to the plaintiff and her daughter that the latter should stay with the defendant as his mistress. Upon their refusal, it is alleged, they were cruelly treated and imprisoned in a fort near Indore, where they were kept in confinement until 1926, i. e., for a period of about eleven years. Upon a petition to the Viceroy, they were, it is said, released and they returned to Bombay on April 30 of that year. The plaintiff further alleges that after their seizure the defendant by his agents took forcible possession of the house in which the plaintiff had been residing, and which she says is her property. It is said to have been transferred to the name of the Indore State in the Municipal records, and eventually all the furniture and various valuable articles, including a motor-car, that belonged to the plaintiff are said to nave been also seized by the directions of the defendant. The house was restored to her on her return, but the furniture and other articles have not been received back. On these allegations she claims damages, first of all, for the false imprisonment that she was subjected to, and the personal injury she suffered while under such imprisonment; secondly, damages for the trespass on her immovable property during the time that she was away in Indore; and, thirdly, the value of the articles that were wrongfully converted or misappropriated by or under the directions of the defendant. There are thus three principal causes of action alleged in the plaint. Of these, the first, viz., the false imprisonment and the personal injury suffered were committed primarily in the Indore State, according to the allegations made in the plaint; but there is a statement in the plaint that the decoying of the plaintiff and her daughter from Bombay was part of a plot which ended in their confinement, so that it is said that part of the cause of action for damages for false imprisonment arose in Bombay. The other two causes of action, viz., trespass on immovable property and wrongful conversion of movable property are clearly causes of action arising within the original jurisdiction of this Court. The plaintiff asked for leave under Clause 12 of the Letters Patent in regard to bringing the suit in Bombay, so far as it asked for damages for false imprisonment, on the basis that part of that cause of action arose within this Court's jurisdiction. The plaintiff further asked that, in the event of its being held that that cause of action arose wholly outside Bombay, an order should be made under Clause 14 of the Letters Patent for joining together in this suit the several causes of action that I have mentioned. At the time of filing the plaint leave both under Clause 12 and under Clause 14 was granted by Mr. Justice Blackwell exparte. The defendant filed his written statement on July 18, 1927. There are three principal contentions raised in it. The first is that the defendant was the ruling chief of the Indore State at all material times mentioned in the plaint and therefore the suit against him was not maintainable The second is that the wrongful acts complained of are alleged to be of the various officers and servants of that State acting under the orders of the defendant, who was the ruling chief of that State, but that as he had abdicated he ceased to be the ruling chief or to represent the Indore State; consequently, it is alleged that the plaint does not disclose any cause of action against him. And, thirdly, it is urged that except the cause of action in regard to trespass and wrongful conversion no part of any of the other causes of action arose within the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of this Court, and, therefore, this Court had no jurisdiction to entertain the suit in respect of any of these causes of action except those for trespass and wrongful conversion. Subsequently there were various proceedings, which ended in December 1927 in a hearing of the question whether an order should he made in favour of the plaintiff as asked for in the plaint under Clause 14 of the Letters Patent. The defendant was, in fact, called upon to show cause why such an order should not be passed, which is the procedure that is contemplated in Clause 14. Mr. Justice Davar held that no sufficient cause for not passing the order prayed for had been shown by the defendant, and on December 12, 1927, passed an order that the leave granted by Mr. Justice Blackwell both under Clause 12 and under Clause 14 should stand. The defendant has appealed against this order to us.

(2.) Mr. Mulla on his behalf has raised three main contentions. The first; is that to bring a case within the four corners of Clause 14 there must first of all be at least one cause of action which the defendant admits has arisen within the original jurisdiction of this High Court, but he has adduced no authority for this proposition and there is nothing in Clause 14 to support it. On the contrary the remarks of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Chand Kour V/s. Partab singh (1888) I.L.R. 16 Cal. 98, p. c. distinctly go against such a contention. There, among other things, it is pointed out that the cause of action in a plaint has no relation whatever to the defence which may be set up by the defendant, it depends almost entirely upon the allegations in the plaint. In any case, the causes of action for trespass on immovable property and wrongful conversion of movable property as stated in paragraphs 6 and 7 of the plaint clearly arose in Bombay, assuming, as the Court must for the purpose of determining the point, that the allegations there made are true, and it would be impossible for the defendant to deny that these causes of action did so arise. I do not, therefore, think that there is anything substantial in this objection.

(3.) The second point taken was that if any of the several causes of action, which are under consideration, is a cause of action "for land," then Clause 14 cannot avail the plaintiff. I may here give the terms of Clause 14 : And We do further ordain that, where plaintiff has several causes of action against a defendant, such causes of action not being for land or other immovable property, and the said High Court shall have original jurisdiction in respect on one such causes of action, it shall be lawful for the said High Court to call on the defendant to show cause why the several causes of action should not be joined together in one suit, and to make such order for trial of the same as to the said High Court shall seem fit. There are three possible constructions of the words "such causes of action not being for land or other immovable property" in this clause. First of all, (a) they may mean "none of such causes of action being for land or other immovable property," or (b) they may mean "such causes of action not being all for land or other immovable property," or (c) they may be equivalent to flaying "excluding any cause of action which is for land or other immovable property." There appears to be no reported authority upon this point, except the remark of the Honourable the Chief Justice, Sir Amberson Marten, in Hatimbhai Baasanally V/s. Framroz Eduljee (1926-7) I.L.R. 51 Bom. 516, s.c. 29 Bom. L.R. 498 at page 524 about this clause, and my remark about it at page 573 of the same case. The Chief Justice's remark may be said to favour the first construction (a) and mine might be said to favour the second construction (b), but each of these remarks is obiter without the point being argued before us.