(1.) The case of the appellant plaintiff in the suit was that the defendants were tenants from year to year and that he was entitled to eject them after giving proper notice as required by law. Should it however be held that they have a permanent leasehold right, the appellant claims that the respondents having denied his title have incurred forfeiture and on that ground also they are liable to be ejected. The defendants are transferees of the land from the original grantee under what is called a Kayam Saswathampatta. The original lessee died long since, and the case of the appellant is that the heirs of the former were holding the land merely as tenants from year to year and that is all the right which the defendants can claim.
(2.) There have been several decisions of this Court with respect to Kayam Saswathampattas and we are bound by the principles regulating their construction as laid down in those cases. Those decisions applied to Kayam Saswathampattas the well known ruling of the Privy Council with reference to Istimrari Mokurari pattas reported in Tulsi Pershad Singh v. Ramnarain Singh (1885) I.L.R. 12 C.117 in which their Lordships held that though these words have a lexicographical significance of a permanent tenure, having regard however to the trend of the cases in which they have been interpreted in the Calcutta Courts they have when used without such phrases as "ba farzandan" (including children or descendants), or "naslanbad Naslan" (generation after generation), a customary meaning importing only a life interest. The Privy Council also laid vdown that in construing a patta, the other terms of the instrument, the circumstances under which it has been made and the conduct of the parties may be taken into consideration in order to ascertain whether the grant was intended to be perpetual, inasmuch as those words are not inconsistent therewith, though they do not themselves import that meaning. This decision was first applied in this Presidency in Bajaram v. Narasinga (1891) I.L.R. 15 M. 199. Its effect was considered in Foulkes v. Muthusami Goundan (1898) I.L.R. 21 M. 503 : 8 M.L.J. 207 where the learned Judges did not express dissent from Rajaram v. Narasinga, The point was again considered recently in Venkataramana v. Venkatapathi where his Lordship, the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Goutts Trotter, though expressing doubts as to the applicability of the ruling in Tulsi Pershad Singh v. Bam Narain Singh (1885) I.L.R 12 C. 117 to Saswatham deeds in this Presidency thought it was too late to go back upon the decision in Rajaram v. Narasinga (1897) I.L.R. 24 C. 440 As the question related to the meaning of words of conveyancing, I agree with the learned Judges that having regard to the decisions in the above mentioned and other cases, we must follow in this Presidency, with reference to Kayam Saswatham deeds the principle of interpretation enunciated in Tulsi Pershad Singh v. Bam Narain Singh (1885) I.L.R 12 C. 117 with reference to Istimrari Mokurari pattas.
(3.) The saswatham deed itself is not forthcoming in this case. It was executed as far back as 1840. There is no evidence to show the circumstances under which the lease was granted. But the subsequent conduct of the parties leaves no doubt that the tenure contemplated was of a permanent heritable character. There have been sales of the tenure both by private treaty and at court auction in some cases at least for a consideration too large to be likely to be paid merely for a tenancy from year to year--and the transfers have been recognised by the landlords. After the original lessees death, the leasehold interest was enjoyed by their heirs as of right, and no attempt appears to have been ever made to assert that the rights of the original grantees ceased with their lives. For about 60 years one uniform rate of rent has been paid. It was in fact only recently that an attempt has been made to question the permanent character of this estate. On this point therefore I agree with the learned Subordinate Judge.