KOMPELLA ANANTHARAMAYYA Vs. CHIKATLA TUKKADU

JUDGEMENT

(1.) It is unnecessary in this matter to repeat the entire history. When the application for sanction for perjury was made to the Sub-Magistrate before whom the petitioners had given evidence he granted the sanction with reference to a particular statement made by the petitioner. That order was set aside by the Joint Magistrate, as in his opinion the order granting sanction was wanting in definiteness. But he granted sanction with reference to another statement made by the petitioner before the same Sub-Magistrate. It appears that the respondent had applied for sanction with reference to the very statement with respect to which sanction was ultimately granted by the Joint Magistrate, Mr. Fotheringham, but the Sub- Magistrate, instead of granting sanction with reference to the statement granted sanction with reference to another statement and Mr. Fotheringham as already stated set aside that order on the ground that it was vague. The question of law arises whether the Joint Magistrate had jurisdiction to grant sanction when he did not try the case himself and whether his Court was a superior Court within the meaning of Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code. It has been ruled language of the Code too far to say that a witness commits perjury not only in the Court where he gives his evidence but also in the appellate Court where he did not give any evidence, and where all that could be said was that the evidence given by him was relied upon by the party interested. Neither he nor the party who called him might even use that evidence but might impeach the decree of the Lower Court on other grounds.

(2.) As regards the words "in relation to any proceeding in any Court" a man giving evidence cannot be said to have any proceeding other than the one in which he is giving evidence in contemplation. When a man gives evidence in a suit or in a criminal case that evidence is given with reference to the original trial of that suit or criminal case. Then as is pointed out by the learned pleader for the petitioner if the intention of the legislature were that any Court hearing the appeal whether it is a superior Court or not could grant sanction because of the words "when such offence is committed in or in relation to any proceeding in any Court" then it would have been superfluous on the part of the legislature to add the words "or of some other Court to which such Court is subordinate."

(3.) It seems to me that it would be going much further than the language of the section warrants to say that an offence like that of perjury or using false evidence is committed once in the Court of trial and afterwards in appeal with reference to that very evidence. The offence is completed when the evidence is given or the document is produced or put in evidence. It cannot be said to be repeated afterwards because there has been an appeal. It may be that the person who committed the offence does not appeal at all. It is difficult to see how an offence committed in the Court of first instance can be said to be multiplied with the number of appeals that are filed. I would therefore dissent from the judgment in Bhadesar Tiwari v. Kamta Prasad (1913) I.L.R., 36 All., 90.