CHAVADI RAMASAMIA PILLAI Vs. EVENKATESWARA AIYAR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) It is argued that these appeals are barred by limitation on the ground that as the general provisions of the Limitation Act have been held not to apply to appeals under Section 46 of the Provincial Insolvency Act the date upon which the order appealed against was made and the Sunday upon which the ninety days allowed by Section 46 expired, cannot be excluded. Section 46 Clause (4) merely declares that ninety days shall be the period of limitation for appeals to the High Court without specifying the method of computing that period.

(2.) Section 9 of the General Clauses Act does not directly apply to this section, in which the words "from" and "to" do not occur. Nevertheless we think it was intended that the computation should be done as it is usually done in appeals under other acts, seeing that no other method is prescribed, that is, that 90 days should be reckoned from the date of the order appealed against. We must therefore apply the general principle contained in Section 9 under which the day on which the act appealed against is done is to be excluded.

(3.) Further under Section 10 of the General Clauses Act, the 22nd April which was a dies non must be excluded, and it is unnecessary to resort to Section 4 of the Limitation Act for this purpose.