ARUNACHALAM PILLAI Vs. PONNUSWAMI PILLAI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These are two petitions, one to revise an order of the District Magistrate of Trichinopoly of the 12th January 1918, the other to revise the order of the Sessions Judge of Trichinopoly of the 1st March 1918. The order of the District Magistrate was made on appeal from an order of the Stationary Sub-Magistrate of Trichinopoly refusing to sanction the prosecution of the present petitioner and another for an offence under Section 18 6, Indian Penal Code. The petitions were the result of an order of the Stationary Sub-Magistrate passed on the 8th May 1917 under Section 144, Criminal Procedure Code, restraining this petitioner and others from taking the Pidari deity in procession through a lane claimed to be the private property of the present counter petitioners. This order was alleged to have been violated and hence the petition for sanction.

(2.) The Stationary Sub-Magistrate declined to grant the sanction on two grounds, one, that the order should not have been passed and that, therefore, disobedience cannot be considered to be an offence; the other, that the petition for sanction was the outcome of previously existing spite. The present counter petitioner appealed to the District Magistrate of Trichinopoly, who decided that, the order having been passed, rightly or wrongly, disobedience to it was an offence and granted the sanction." This is one of the orders appealed against. The petitioner appealed from that decision to the Sessions Judge, who passed the following order: "The order appears to have been made by the District Magistrate as an administrative officer, and I think, therefore, that no appeal lies to this Court. Petition is dismissed." This is the other order appealed against.

(3.) The petitioner before us first argued that the order of the District Magistrate granting sanction against him was passed by him as a public servant, that no appeal lay to the Sessions Judge and that, therefore, he was entitled to come to the High Court. On this petition it is, in our opinion, enough to say that if the order was passed by the District Magistrate administratively, the High Court has no appellate or revisional power. We asked the learned Vakil to invite our attention to any provision either in the Government of India Act or the Letters Patent, or in the Criminal Procedure Code which makes a public servant qua such servant and not qua Court subordinate to the authority of the High Court as required by Section 195, Sub-section 6, and he was unable to show us any. We, therefore, dismiss this petition.