A N A RAMACHANDRA RAO Vs. TBRAMACHANDRA RAO

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Construing this very deed in A.S. No. 74 of 1896 Collins, C.J. and Shepherd, J. observed " There being no indication of intention to give a larger estate we must assume that the husband intended that a widow s estate only should pass." The trend of the later decisions in this Court beginning with Sambasiva Aiyar v. Venkateswara Aiyar 1907) I.L.R. 31 M. 179 is against making any such assumption, and they appear to be supported by the judgment of the judicial Committee in Surajmani v. Rabi Nath Ojha (1917) I.L.R 30 A. 84 which cites with approval a ruling of Milter, J. in Kollany Kooer v. Luchmee Pershad (1875) 24 W.R. 395 that there is no presumption that a gift to a widow means a limited gift.

(2.) We must, I think, take it to be now settled at any rate so far as this Court is concerned, and until the decisions to which, I have referred are overruled by higher authority, that the rule laid down by the Judicial Committee in Moulvi Mahomed Shumool Hooda v. Shewakram (1874) L.R. 2 I.A. 7 is a rule of construction to be applied only when there is some uncertainty or ambiguity in the language of the instrument before the Court.

(3.) The question then is, is there anything in the terms of Ex. III which warrants the application of the rule. The opening recital is to the effect that the settlor made " the following gifts (inams) of the (properties belonging to him on the occasion of his adopting as his son a boy of ten years of age. There is first a gift of chattels and money to a maternal nephew, then directions that certain allowances of paddy should continue to be paid to two descendants of his maternal uncles, that six Brahmins should be fed daily from the income of certain lands, and that a saffron allowance of Ks. 25 should continue to be paid to his sister. Then comes the disposition in favour of the widows. Of the remaining property the adopted boy " is to be entitled to and enjoy one-half." "Of the remaining half these two persons, my senior wife Sowbagiavathi Kamatchi and my junior wife Sowbagiavathi Tulja shall each take a half". On the language of this instrument, I have come to the conclusion that there is no sufficient reason for cutting down the disposition in favour of the widows. Herabai v. Lakshmibai (1887) I.L.R 11 B 573 was decided on the view that there is a general presumption that a gift to a woman is only of a woman s estate, though on the language of that document, which was different from the language here, the rule of construction laid down in Moulvi Malomed Shumsool Hooda v. Shewakram (1874) L.R 2 I. A 7 may have been applicable as was held, though with a different result in Seshayya v. Narasamma (1899) I.L.R. 22 M. 357. Sir Charles Sargent, however, in the course of his judgment spoke of "the extreme improbability that having adopted a son the testator, should have intended to give more than a life-estate, or at the utmost, a widow s estate to his wife," As I stated at the hearing, my very general impression derived from the cases which have come before me is, that there is no such extreme improbability in this Presidency and my learned brother, whose opinion on such a point is entitled to much greater weight, is of the same opinion, I concur in the order proposed. Seshagiri Aiyar, J.