(1.) In these cases the question is of the validity of the two Melcharths in plaintiff s favour, executed by some of defendants on behalf of the Devaswom, of which they had control.
(2.) The lower Appellate Court s main ground of decision against plaintiff is that the Melcharths are unenforceable, because their execution with recitals in them regarding the nature of the executant s control over the Devaswom was a step towards carrying out a scheme for their aggrandisement by setting up the private nature of their trust and was, therefore, a breach of that trust. We have not been shown authority, which would justify sueh a decision; and we cannot accept it especially as, in our opinion, defendants further case also, that plaintiff acted in bad faith, is not supported by evidence.
(3.) As regards the last mentioned point, the lower Appellate Court found that consideration passed for the Melcharths. But it held that such consideration "was not utilised for the benefit of the Devaswom and that plaintiff, therefore, was not shown to have taken the document bona fide," because the debt alleged as having been discharged with, the money was not shown to have been binding on the Devaswom. The lower Appellate Court overlooked the facts that the terms of the kanoms, with which the Melcharths were connected, had elapsed, and that, therefore, the grant of the latter was an ordinary incident of the management, the propriety of which the plaintiff was under no obligation to scrutinise further; and, as was observed in the judgment in Second Appeal No. 965 of 1903, persons dealing with the agent of a Devaswom in such matters of every, day management are not bound to enquire into the existence of any particular necessity for funds by the Devaswom or into the application of such funds by the agent. We, therefore, dissent from the lower Court s conclusion on this point also.