SOVA CHAND BHUTORIA Vs. HURRY BUX DEORA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The facts are fully set forth in the judgment of Greaves, J., which I need not repeat. It is sufficient to say that there was an award in an arbitration made in a suit and that this award was set aside by the Court. When it was set aside, Counsel for the party now appellant stated at the Bar that having considered the materials before him, he could not resist the order which the plaintiff sought and which was in fact made. A review of this order was then asked for by the appellant on the ground that the application to set aside the award was barred by limitation under Article 158 of the Indian Limitation Act (1908), more than 10 days having elapsed since the date when the award was submitted to the Court. This involves a consideration of the question of the meaning of the words "submission" and "Court".

(2.) In the appeal it is contended on the authority of the decision of Harington, J., in the case reported as Nobin Kally Dabee v. Ambica Churn Banerjee 5 C. W. N. 813, that the time from which limitation runs is the date on which the award is received by the Registrar (in this case the 10th October 1917), and not the date on which the award is filed (in this case the 22nd November). Assuming that this decision is correct, it is not established that the application to set aside the award was barred, for the respondent is entitled to exclude the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the award. An application for copy was made on 3rd September. This application was premature in that no award had then been received. When, however, it was received on the 10th of October, the application still subsisting took effect and in fact it is found that it was on the strength of this application that a copy was subsequently given. The question then is what was the time "requisite." From the 10th October to the 17th November the Court was closed and on the 22ad November the award was filed.

(3.) A copy could not under the rules be given of the award until it was filed and from 22nd to 27th November was taken up in supplying a copy of the award previously filed. There is no difficulty here, unless it is shown that it was the duty of the respondent to file the award and that he could and should have done so between the 17th and 22nd November. But the duty of the respondent in this respect is not, I think, made out. No provision to that effect has been shown us and on the contrary rule 10, Schedule II, of the Civil Procedure Code provides that the arbitrator should cause the award to be filed and notice of the filing shall be given to the parties. It cannot be said, therefore, there was any laches and the time during the period 10th October and 27th November should be excluded. It is not, as the learned Judge holds, that time commenced to run from the 27th November, but it commenced to run (on this hypothesis) from the 10th October but the time requisite for obtaining a copy must be excluded.