CROWN PROSECUTOR Vs. BHAGAVATHI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application by the Crown Prosecutor for quashing the commitment made by the 3rd Presidency Magistrate, George Town, Madras, to the High Court Sessions of a case falling under Section 304(A) of the Indian Penal Code punishable with 2 years imprisonment of either description or fine (of unlimited amount) or both and triable by a Court of Sessions or a Presidency Magistrate or a Magistrate of the First Class. The ground on which we are asked to quash the commitment is that under Section 254 of the Criminal Procedure Code a Magistrate ought to try a case himself till it ends in a conviction or acquittal before him (see Section 258) unless he thinks that the offence could not be adequately punished by him, and that in this case it was impossible for the Magistrate to entertain such an opinion because he had powers under the Code to inflict imprisonment of either description up to 2 years which is the maximum punishment provided for the offence. This argument, in the first place, ignores the fact that the offence is also punishable with fine of unlimited extent, whereas the Presidency Magistrate s powers of fining are limited to the amount of Rs. 1,000. (See Section 32, Crl. Pro. Code, Clause (a)) and cases are conceivable where a rich man guilty under Section 304, (A) could more appropriately be sentenced to a fine of Rs. 5,000 by a Sessions Court than by a Presidency Magistrate with imprisonment and a fine of Rs. 1,000. However this is a minor point.

(2.) The important question is, whether Section 254 does make it imperative on the magistrate, if the offence could adequately be punished by him, to try the case till the end and whether it imperatively forbids him from committing the case to the Sessions. Bo far as the words of Section 254 go, that section only directs the magistrate to frame a charge against the accused. What the magistrate has to do after framing the charge must depend upon the provisions contained in the succeeding sections of the Code dealing with the further proceedings in the trials of warrant cases. In Chapter XXIV containing general provisions as to enquiries and trials, we have got 3 Sections--Ss. 346,347 and 349--which we were invited in the arguments to consider in this connection. Section 346 relates to the procedure of a magistrate other than a Presidency Magistrate in certain contingencies. That section may therefore be ruled out. As regards Section 349 it relates to the procedure of a magistrate of a 2nd or 3rd class under certain circumstances. That also has therefore no material bearing in the consideration of the question before us. Then we have got Section 347 which gives very wide powers to a magistrate, In any trial or proceeding before him and at any stage he can even just before signing judgment, commit a case before him to a Court; of Session or the High Court, (provided, of course, he is empowered to commit cases to that court) if it appears to him that the case is one which ought to be tried by a Court of Session or the High Court. It does not restrict the grounds on which he should arrive at his opinion to want of jurisdiction himself, or to his inability in his own opinion to sentence the accused adequately. If he considers, for instance, that a complicated question of law arises or that some connected matter is already before the Court of Session or that the facts are such that trial with the aid of a jury or with the aid of assessors (who may be chosen from experts in the particular matters involved in the case) would be a more satisfactory procedure, I see nothing in Section 347 to prevent a Magistrate from committing the case to a Court of Session. Section 347 does not say that the magistrate is bound to put his reasons on record for entertaining the opinion that the case is one which ought to be tried by the Court of Session or the High Court. No doubt the decision of a Bench in Queen Empress v. Kayemulla Mandal (1887) I.L.R. 24 C. 429 and the decisions of single Judges of the Allahabad High Court in King Emperor v. Dharam Singh (1906) 1 M.L.T. 61 and Emperor v. Jagmohan (1909) 11 Cr. L.J. 54. do support the contention of the Crown Prosecutor that unless the magistrate thinks that he is unable to punish the accused adequately he ought not to commit the accused to the Court of Session. There are however two decisions, one Empress v. Kudruloollah (1878) I.L.R. 3 C 495 and the other (of a Full Bench in this Court) In the matter of Chinnimarigadu (1876) I.L.R. 1 M. 289 where there are observations which, in my opinion, indicate that the committal by a competent magistrate on the ground that in the Magistrate s opinion the case is a fit one to be tried by a Court of Session cannot be interfered with by the High Court. And I think that the Calcutta case (Queen Empress v. Kayemullah Mandal (1897) I.L.R. 24 C. 429) and the two Allahabad cases (King Emperor v. Dharam Singh (1906) M.L.T. 61 and Emperor v. Jagmohan (1909) 11 Cr. L.J. 54) have given much wider effect to the language of Section 254 than that language could properly support. That section makes it imperative on the magistrate only to frame a charge and not to complete the trial to conviction or acquittal. I would therefore dismiss: this petition. Napier, J.

(3.) I entirely agree. We are asked to exercise our powers under Section 215 of the Criminal Procedure Code and quash a commitment to the High Court made by the Presidency Magistrate. We can of course only do so on a point of law and we are therefore not concerned with the reasons given by the magistrate for making the commitment.