FANINDRA NATH BANERJEE Vs. EMPEROR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These cases were tried before a Judge and Jury. The Judge agreeing with a majority of the Jury, four to one, convicted the prisoners of an offence under Section 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, and sentenced them to transportation for life. The appeals, therefore, cannot succeed, unless the appellants can satisfy us that there was some misdirection by the learned Judge in his charge to the Jury. The first criticism upon the action of the Judge is that, whilst the verdict was delivered on the 29 May 1908, and the sentence was passed on the 5 June following, his charge to the Jury was not written out until the 29th June. Reference has been made to Section 367 of the Criminal P. C.. That section does not assist the appellants, for there is a proviso that "in trials by Jury, the Court need not write a judgment, but the Court of Session should record the heads of the charge to the Jury." There is nothing there as to when it must be written, as in the case of a judgment by the Court dealt with in a preceding part of the section. If we refer to the Circular Orders of this Court, Chapter I, Order 59, we find an express order to the effect that it is not necessary that the direction to the Jury should be reduced to writing before delivery, but it is essential that the "heads of charge" ( Section 367) placed upon the record should represent with absolute accuracy the substance of the charge, and be such as to enable the High Court, in the event of an appeal, to see distinctly, whether the case was fairly and properly placed before the Jury. Whilst, therefore, there is nothing in the point to assist the appellants, we think it is very unsatisfactory that the charge to the Jury was not, in the case before us, written out until the 29 June, nearly three weeks after the sentence. We are strongly of opinion that in these cases such charge ought to be written out as soon as possible after the charge to the Jury has been actually delivered, and when the facts of the case are fresh in the mind of the Judge.

(2.) The first point of misdirection is that the Judge did not read the medical evidence to the Jury, but one has only to look at the charge to see that there were frequent references to the medical evidence. There is nothing that makes it incumbent upon any Judge to read the whole of the depositions of the witnesses to the Jury, and, we think, in the present case the medical evidence was sufficiently attracted to their attention.

(3.) Then it is said that the Judge did not sufficiently warn the Jury that the omission of the prosecution to call certain witnesses, and particularly the palki-bearers, raised a presumption that their evidence would be unfavourable to the prosecution, and reference is made to Section 114 Ill. (g) of the Evidence Act. It is perfectly true that in his charge we do not find the word "presumption," but again and again the Judge has pointed out to the Jury that they might properly draw any inferences they pleased from the fact that these witnesses were not called. There is no substance in this point.