GANPATRAO MOROJI Vs. VAMANRAO SHAMRAO

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The material facts, which are all undisputed, are that four brothers Krishnanath, Vinayak, Ganapatrao and Narayen were left an estate, share and share alike. This they managed together; no division of the estate into lots was made. Krishnanath, as the eldest, managed till his death, leaving a widow Luxmibai; then Vinayak managed till his death, leaving a widow Satyabhamabai; and thereafter Ganapatrao managed till Luxmibai brought her suit to have it declared that she was entitled to her deceased husband Krishnanath's one-fourth of the whole property movable and immovable. Ganapatrao resisted the claim on the ground that the four brothers had constituted a joint Hindu family. The Court held that they had not, and that the property was no more than a property held by the four objects of the testator's bounty, in severalty; and decreed that the said property be now separated, the shares defined,and assigned to Luxmibai and Satyabhamabai, the widows of Krishnanath and Vinayak, and Ganapatrao and Narayen, the surviving brothers, respectively. Further that Luxmibai the plaintiff was to have an "absolute" estate in all the movable property coming to her under this decree, and a life estate only in the immovable property. We are not here concerned with Satyabhamabai.

(2.) On appeal this judgment was confirmed with a single exception. The Appeal Court changed the words " life estate" to "a. widow's estate during her life". Thereupon Ganapatrao as manager had to account for his management of the fourth part of the property which Was now decreed to Luxmibai. I am told that Luxmibai surcharged heavily, claiming nearly forty thou-sand rupees. But the amount is immaterial. It is material that taking accounts went on very slowly, and that after two of three years Ganapatrao came to an agreement with Luxmibai, by which the parties to this suit took a consent decree, giving Luxmibai the like absolute estate in all the immovable, as; he decree had already given her in all the movable, property of her deceased husband Krishnanath. And it was further agreed to abandon all further taking of accounts, and that, Luxmibai should renounce any and every claim in respect of those accounts or future maintenance, which she might otherwise have been advised to press. Pursuant to this it was further agreed that all the property should be sold, and that the proceeds of the sale should be divided, and Luxmibai's share given to her in cash. Looking to what had been decreed in the first instance, and to the amendment, and then to the terms of the consent decree, it appears to me, though this is of course not undisputed, that the transaction admits of only one construction; namely that Ganapatrao and Narayen renounced all claim to enforce what is called the fetter on the woman's power of disposition over estate inherited from her husband, and gave her by this method (which converts what property would have fallen under that part of the Appeal Court's decree conferring a widow's estate during her life into property in which under the same decree she had an absolute interest) all and every power over the whole which the learned Judges who made those decrees clearly intended that she should take under the term " absolute. " In other words, for the general convenience, and their own in particular, to save trouble and expense, and the possibility at least of having to pay over a large sum, they said, " if you will stop these proceedings before the commissioner, renounce your claims on us for any recoveries we may have made during our management of your property, we will, as the reversioners, renounce our claims on all the immovable property which belonged to your husband, we will give you an absolute estate in it, instead of the limited estate the Courts have given you, and what is more, Ave will join with you in selling it, and thus reducing it from real to personal estate, and will hand over to you, as movable property your share of the price, to be, with the other movable property of your late husband in which the Courts have already given you an absolute interest, thenceforward absolutely your own." That is how I understand what was intended to be done; and there cannot be the least doubt or question that that is how the present plaintiffs themselves understood it at that time. This is clear from the language of Exhibit 5. Accordingly the Court made the consent decree, giving the widow Luxmibai an absolute estate not only in the movables but in the immovable property of her late husband Krishnanath; and, as the" most convenient way of dis-tributing the whole property, it directed the sale of the immovables. The result was that, all parties assenting, what immovable property there had been, belonging to Krishnanath, was sold and the plaintiffs paid over to Luxmibai between fifteen and sixteen thousand rupees. She thus started either as the heir of her late husband or by special arrangement with this sum of money plus whatever other movables she may have had of his. And when she died in 1895 she had a considerably larger sum, which she disposed of by will. Probate was granted, the plaintiffs were cited; they did not till the filing of this suit in 1907 raise any objection to the administration. Now they say that Luxmibai had no power of disposal, that, in respect of all that she took from her husband, she had only the widow's estate for life, and that as the reversioners they are entitled to recover all that she died possessed of.

(3.) The case thus stated looks simple, but it may prove to involve questions which are not simple. One thing is plain, that the principles upon which the decision must rest are all principles of pure law. Up to that point there are no facts in dispute. I was asked more than once to approach the case without prejudice. Being as it is an abstract question of law, I do not see where prejudice comes in, and for that matter I think that the less a Judge has to do with sympathies and sentiments the better. I have to consider a very elaborate subtle and ingenious argument, that is all. I have to see whether that argument, in my opinion, warrants its conclusion. If the plaintiff is legally entitled to any or all the reliefs claimed, he must have them.