LALIT MOHUN SINGH ROY Vs. CHUKKUN LAL ROY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE question on these appeals is the construction of the will of a Hindu gentleman named Saroda Pershad Roy, who died on March 18,1868, at the age of thirty-three years. The testator was a man of considerable wealth, and, as appears from his will, was of a benevolent and generous disposition, and was also anxious for the maintenance and honour of his family. He left no issue, but left; one widow, who died in February, 1888, about a year before the institution of the present suit. The District Judge held that the testator's nephew, the appellant, Lalit Mohun Roy, took an heritable and alienable interest in the testator's estate, subject to a charitable gift, which will be mentioned presently, but reserved the question whether any defeasance of Lalit Mohun's estate was intended, as the events requiring a decision of that question might never arise. The decree of the District Judge was reversed by the High Court. Sir W. C. Petheram C.J. and, Chunder Madhub Ghose J. held that the appellant, Lalit Mohun Roy, has only a life interest in the testator's estate; that the gift over to take effect in the event of the failure of male issue of the appellant in the male line is bad in law and invalid; and that subject to the appellant's life interest, and subject to the bequests, legacies, and charges made in favour of religious and charitable institutions, the plaintiffs in the action as heirs-at-law are entitled to succeed to the estate left by the testator. The present appeal is from this decision of the High Court.

(2.) THERE are two cardinal principles in the construction of wills, deeds, and other documents which their Lordships think are applicable to the decision of this case. The first is that clear and unambiguous dispositive words are not to be controlled or qualified by any general expression of intention. The second is, to use Lord Denman's language, that technical words or words of known legal import must have their legal effect, even though the testator uses inconsistent words, unless those inconsistent words are of such a nature as to make it perfectly clear that the testator did not mean to use the technical terms in their proper sense: Doe v. Gallini. (1) 5 B. & Ad. 621.

(3.) "It is very necessary that there should be some special ordination to secure temporal and spiritual welfare; and that suitable means providing that the work so ordained to be done should, after my death, be carried on without interruption, and that the members of my family should have no trouble, and that, hereafter my sthalabhishikta (persons installed in my place) should not, by destroying the property, &c., at pleasure, extinguish the name of my family and become troublers, &c."