SOUTHEKAL KRISHNA RAO Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an appeal by one Krishna Rao against an order of the Acting Judicial Commissioner of Court, Mr. Plumer, by which he struck the name of the petitioner off the roll of second grade pleaders in the Courts of Court.

(2.) THE facts out of which the appeal arises are as follows. One Nanjappah had instituted a suit in which he had been unsuccessful. He had appealed once, and he desired to appeal again. The present appellant, who was at that time a vakil, was going to Bangalore, and he was requested by Nanjappah to give instructions to a barrister of the name of Meenakshaya, at Bangalore, to take such steps as might be necessary for this appeal; and on the 27th or 29th of January 1880, Nanjappah remitted to the appellant a sum of Rs. 80 for stamps and court-fees. It appears that the appellant did, in accordance with the directions he had received from Nanjappah. hand over the papers relating to the case, and the Rs. 80, to Mr. Meenaksbaya. Mr. Meenakshaya was at that time about to leave Bangalore for two or three days, and he took the papers with him. He appears to have left on the 1st of February. On the 2nd of February the appellant, either in consequence, as he says, of a telegram from Nanjappah, or of his own motion, went to the office of Meenkashaya and there saw one of his clerks. There is a question as to what information he received from that clerk with regard to the appeal. The appellant says that he was told in answer to his inquiry than the appeal might have been filed, by which their Lordships understand' him to mean that as Mr. Meenakshaya was away, the clerks did not know what had been in fact done, but that it might have been filed by him before he left. The clerk, however, gives a different account of the transaction, and says that all that he said was that the appeal might be filed when Mr. Meenakshaya returned. Whichever of those two statements is correct it does not justify, literally, the telegram which the appellant sent to Nanjappah, because he telegraphed to him "Appeal filed Saturday; hearing not fixed." From his own point of view of the facts, it would appear that he assumed that the appeal had been filed, whereas, as he admits, all the information he received was that it might have been filed. That certainly is an inaccurate telegram. But the first question which underlies all these proceedings is whether or not it was a fraudulent statement by him that the appeal had been filed on Saturday. Now, as he had handed over the papers and the Rs. 80 to Mr. Meenakshaya, who had taken the papers out of town for the purpose of considering what should be done, it does not appear that there could have been any motive for the appellant's telegraphing falsely and fraudulently that the appeal had been filed, and it would appear more natural to come to the conclusion that there had. been some misunderstanding on his part, or that he incautiously and improperly telegraphed as a fact that that bad been done which the clerk had stated was probable. It has been suggested by the Commissioner, who has finally reported on the case, that he may have anticipated the event3 which did subsequently occur, namely, that Mr. Meenakshaya would return the money, and so he would have an opportunity of appropriating it, or some of it. That is taking a very hostile view of his conduct, and their Lordships are not prepared to say that the facts lead with any degree of certainty to so adverse a conclusion. But as a matter of fact the appellant did receive back from Mr. Meenakshaya the papers and Rs. 60, Mr. Meenakshaya retaining Rs. 20 as his fee for advising upon the case. The appellant did not, as he ought to have done, hand over that Rs. 60, or at any rate as much of it as he considered should be paid after deducting some reasonable sum for his own expenses. He did not in fact hand over any. In the following December, Mr. Hayes, a barrister, was instructed by Nanjapph to write to the petitioner asking him to render an account of the money which he had received back from Meenakshaya. The petitioner wrote to Mr. Hayes saying that he was entitled to retain Rs. 20. He also said: " After my return to this place Nanjappah never asked for the money. If he had done so, I was ready to pay him Rs. 40, after deducting Rs. 20 which Mr. Meenakshaya had retained, and Rs. 20 for my travelling expenses. Such being the case, I was astonished to see your letter." He did not, however, remit the money to Nanjappah, but he alleges that on the following 28th of February 1881, he paid a sum of Rs. 30 to Mr. Hayes, which together with another sum of Es. 10, which he had previously given him, made up a sum of Rs. 40, on account of this claim of Nanjappah and by way of proving that, he produced a letter from Mr. Hayes which simply demands payment of Rs. 30, and upon which letter the appellant states that he made a memorandum of those two payments of Rs. 30 and Rs. 10, making up the Rs. 40 which he had expressed his willingness to pay in his letter to Mr. Hayes.

(3.) IN that state of things Nanjappah instituted proceedings against the petitioner of a criminal nature. When those proceedings came on for hearing a compromise was arrived at by its being agreed that Nanjappah should receive the whole Rs. 80 back again. There is a question how that Rs. 80 was made up. The appellant says that half of it was paid by Mr. Hayes, the other half being furnished by him. Mr. Hayes, however, denies that he furnished anything, and represents that the whole of it was paid by the appellant under fear of the proceedings that had been taken against him. A compromise was effected by the receipt of the Es. 80 by Nanjappah. But although the claim of Nanjappah was thus put an end to, proceedings were afterwards instituted-the proceedings which are now the subject of appeal before this Board-against the appellant in his character of pleader and officer of the Court. Those proceedings took place before Colonel Hill, who is the Commissioner of Court. It does not appear very clearly what led to the institution of those proceedings, but it is unnecessary to inquire into their origin, as if it became known to an officer presiding in a Subordinate Court that one of the practitioners before that Court has been guilty of unprofessional conduct, it would be within the scope of his duties to take steps for the purpose of having that matter adjudicated upon. That would properly take place under the 14th section of the Legal Practitioners Act, No. XVIII of 1379, which provides that "if any such pleader practising in any Subordinate Court is charged in such Court or office with any such misconduct"--that is (referring back to the preceding section)-- "in the discharge.of his professional duty," then that certain steps shall be taken. The presiding officer is to send him a copy of the charge, and also a notice that on a day to be thereby appointed such charge will be taken into consideration. Ultimately it becomes the duty of such officer, if he finds the charge established, and considers that the pleader should be suspended or dismissed in consequence, to record his finding and the grounds thereof, and to report the same to the High Court, and the "High Court may acquit, suspend, or dismiss the pleader or mukhtar."