ADVOCATE-GENERAL OF MADRAS Vs. KUPPUSWAMI GURUKKAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The sole matter for consideration in this appeal is the construction of Section 75-A of the Madras Hindu Religious Endowments Act, 1927. That section was added by the Amending Act X of 1946 which came into force on 2nd April, 1946.

(2.) The relevant facts can shortly be stated. In C.S. No. 202 of 1938, this Court passed a decree on 2nd December, 1940, framing a scheme for the Sri Dharmaraja and Sri Vembuliamman temples. The scheme provides for a single trustee and that every vacancy in the office of trusteeship shall be filled by the Court on an application made to it for that purpose. The first trustee was named in the scheme, and, he having died, the Court on 31 January, 1946, appointed another in his place. This was before the addition of Section 75-A to the Act. The gentleman so appointed refused to accept the office whereupon the first and second respondents in this appeal, who are worshippers of the temples, made an application to this Court after Section 75-A had been included in the Act, seeking for the appointment of a trustee. Notice of the application was given to the Advocate-General, Madras, who appeared at the hearing of the application before Kunhi Raman, J. The learned Advocate-General contended that by virtue of the included section the Hindu Religious Endowments Board and not the Court has vested in it the power of appointment of a new trustee. The learned Judge rejected the argument and duly made an appointment to fill the vacancy. This is the appeal by the Advocate General against the learned Judge's order.

(3.) Section 75-A provides as follows: In any scheme settled by a Court whether before or after the passing of this Act, under Section 92 of the Civil P. C., 1908, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context, all powers of administration vested by such scheme in any Court, Judge, Committee or other authority or person shall be deemed to have been vested in the Board and the Board shall, notwithstanding any provision of this Act, exercise such powers in accordance with the said scheme. It is manifest that by the scheme decree the Court alone is vested with the power of appointment of a trustee. The matter for consideration is whether the section, cited above, has rendered that part of the scheme a nullity, deprived the Court of its power of appointment of the trustee and, I would add, ousted the Court's jurisdiction to make such appointment.