D CHENCHIAH Vs. COMMISSIONER OF POLICE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) On the 23 January, 1947, at 4-30 or 5 a.m., the twelve petitioners were arrested by police officers; but were not told why they were arrested, or under whose orders they were arrested, or even under what provision of law. From their homes they were taken to the Central Jail at Vellore. Later on, during the working hours of the Government Press, Ordinance I of 1947, signed by the Governor of Madras, was published in the Fort St. George Gazette of that day, Part IV-B, Extraordinary, which empowered the Provincial Government or the Chief Presidency Magistrate to issue an order for the detention of any person, if the Provincial Government or the Chief Presidency Magistrate, as the case might be, was satisfied that it was necessary to detain that person with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the public safety or to the maintenance of public order. In the course of the same day, two of the petitioners filed applications under Section 491 of the Criminal P. C. for the issue of write of the nature of Habeas Corpus directing the Government of Madras to produce the petitioners before the Court. Neither the Chief Presidency Magistrate nor the Superintendent of the Central Jail, Vellore, was impleaded, as it was not then known who had issued the order for arrest or where the petitioners were detained. On Monday, the 27 January, the remaining petitioners filed petitions asking for the same reliefs.

(2.) It was alleged that these petitioners were illegally arrested and detained, because they were not told by the police officers arresting them under what authority the arrests were made. Having since become acquainted with Ordinance I of 1947, two arguments have been put forward on behalf of the petitioners. The first is that the arrests were illegal, because they were effected at a time when the Ordinance had not become law, in that it had not, as required by Section 88 of the Government of India Act, been promulgated. The second is that the requirements of Section 4 of the Ordinance had not been complied with, in that the petitioners had not been informed on what grounds they had been detained.

(3.) When the matter came on for hearing on Wednesday, the 29 January, no reasons had by then been given to the petitioners. On that day the petitions were adjourned to give the learned Counsel for the petitioners an opportunity of meeting the points raised by the learned Crown Prosecutor and of impleading the Chief Presidency Magistrate, who was found to have issued the order. On Friday, the date to which the petitions were adjourned, an affidavit was filed by the Chief Presidency Magistrate to the effect that he had given reasons to the petitioners, that he had informed them that they could make representations against the orders concerning them, and that he would give them every facility to do so. In view of this affidavit, it is unnecessary to say very much with regard to the second point raised by the learned Counsel against the validity of the detention. It is very difficult, without having before us all the material available, to decide whether or no the Presidency Magistrate was justified in not communicating to the petitioners for more than a week the grounds on which his order had been based; but as he presumably knew the grounds before he issued the order, one would have expected him to have furnished the petitioners with the reasons for their arrests and detention within a day or so. Since, however, the reasons were subsequently furnished, we should not be justified in ordering the release of the petitioners on the ground of this delay.