BANSIRAM Vs. MODAN SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The facts giving rise to this second appeal may be shortly stated Bansi Ram and others obtained a decree for Rs. 1,500 and costs against one Modan Singh. The amount was to be recovered by the sale of the mortgaged property. When the decree-holders started execution proceedings, Modan Singh made an application to the Debt Conciliation Board under Section 9, Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act. After the decree-holders had appeared before the Board, Modan Singh offered to pay them Rs. 350 in full and final settlement of their claim. The decree-holders refused to accept the amount offered. On this, by their order of 3 February 1944 the Board adjourned the case to 16 March 1944, in order to enable the decree- holders to consider over the matter, On 16 March the decree-holders failed to put in appearance. The Board then passed an order discharging their debt. In the meanwhile the decree-holders had applied to the executing Court on 10th February 1944 for the revival of the execution proceedings, which had been stayed in accordance with the Robkar of the Debt Conciliation Board, on the plea that the Board had authorized them to prosecute the execution application. The executing Court issued a notice to the judgment-debtor who when he appeared before the Court produced a copy of the Board's order discharging the decree-holders debt. On 13 May 1944 the decree-holders made another application to the executing Court stating that the facts given in their previous application were not correct and praying that the proceedings in the execution application should continue, because the order of the Board discharging the debt was without jurisdiction. The matter was put in issue but was found against the decree-holders. Their appeal halving been dismissed by the learned District judge, They have come to this Court.

(2.) Two points were urged before me by the appellants learned Counsel: (1) that the Board had no jurisdiction to adjourn the case from 3 February 1944 to 16th March 1944 and Consequently their final order discharging the debt on account of the failure of decree-holders to put in appearance on 16 March was illegal and that even if the order of the Board dated 3 February was not without jurisdiction, decree-holders had sufficient cause for their failure to appear on the next day and there was no justification on the part of the Board to discharge their debt.

(3.) As regards the first point, both the countsel are agreed that Sub-section (3) of Section 13, Punjab Relief of Indebtedness Act, Under which the Board presumably passed the final order discharging the debt, does not contemplate an order to this effect in so many words of the Sub-section are: If the creditor....fails without sufficient cause to the present....at any of the hearings fixed by the board....the debt due to him....shall be deemed for all purposes and all occasions to have been fully discharged. This means that if a creditor fails to appear before the Board on any of the dates fixed by its and the Board is of opinion that his failure to be present is without sufficient cause, it has simply to record these facts and the debt shall standi discharged automatically by process of law Reference in this connection may be made to Mohomed Din V/s. Phula Singh. 31 A.I.R.1944 Lah.127 where it was observed that the discharge of a debt is the automatic result of the statutory provisions of Section is (2) and of the Act and no order of the Board is required declaring the debt to be discharged. I am, however, of the opinion that the mere fact that a Board's order contains a note that the debt shall standi discharged does not make the whole order illegal, because the pact of it that relates to discharge of the debt can be treated as redundant and ignored The real question, therefore to be considered in connection with the first point is whether the Board was competent to adjourn the proceedings on 3 February 1944 to 16 March 1944 and the creditors failure to be present on the adjourned date can be visited by the penalty provided in Sub-section (3) of Section 13. The counsel argued that when a creditor appears before the Board and the debtor makes an offer, which the former refuses to accept, all that the Board is required to do is to determine whether the debtor's offer is such that the creditor ought reasonably to accept and if it comes to the conclusion that it is, it has merely to grant the debtor a certificate in respect of the debt that he Owes to the creditor and it has no jurisdiction whatever to adjourn the proceedings for any purpose. In support of his contention the counsel relied upon Sub-section (1) of Section 20 and the observations made by Abdul Rashid, J. in Kumar Uddin V/s. Kishen Das. 32 A.I.R.1945 Lah,223. The following are the words of Section 20 (1): Where daring the hearing of any application made Under Section 9, any creditor refuses to agree to an amicable settlement, the Board may, if it is of opinion that the debtor has made such creditor a fair offer which the creditor ought reasonably to accept, grant the debtor a certificate in such form as may be prescribed in respect of the debts owed by him to such creditor. Now this section must be read with the other sections of the Act and in the light of the fact that the principal function of a Debt Conciliation Board is to bring about an amicable settlement between the debtor who applies under Section 9 and his creditors. Section 15 of the Act definitely lays down that the Board shall call upon the debtor and each creditor to explain his case regarding each debt, and shall use its best endeavours to induce them to arrive at an amicable settlement. If the endeavours to be made by the Board to bring about an amicable settlement between the debtor and his creditors are to be genuine and successful, the Board should have the right to adjourn the proceedings and to allow the parties time to think Over the matter before making up their minds one way or the other. To say that as soon as an offer is made by a debtor and it is rejected by his creditor the Board must at once make up its mind whether it is going to pronounce it as fair, without allowing any time to itself to consider the matter or to the creditor to ponder over it, is to ignore the provisions of Section 15 altogether. My View, therefore, is that every Board has inherent power to adjourn the proceedings with a view, inter alia, to enable the creditor to decide for himself whether he should or should not accept the debtor's offer. A perusal of Sub-section (3) and (4) of Section 13 would also go to show that the Legislature contemplated adjournments of the proceedings. The words of Sub- section (3) are: If the creditor....fails without sufficient cause to be present in person or....at any of the hearing fixed by the Board etc., the debt due to him or to the joint creditors, at the case may be, shall be deemed for all purposes and all occasions to have been fully discharged. These words to my mind leave no doubt that the Board can fix any number of hearings before deciding the applications made to it.