LAWS(PVC)-1947-4-80

SINGANAMALLA KRISHNAMURTHY ALIAS YELLA KRISHNAMURTHY Vs. YELLA VENKATARAMANAPPA

Decided On April 15, 1947
SINGANAMALLA KRISHNAMURTHY ALIAS YELLA KRISHNAMURTHY Appellant
V/S
YELLA VENKATARAMANAPPA Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The property which is the subject-matter of the suit out of which this appeal arises belonged to one Chinnayya. The plaintiff claims to be a son of Chinnayya by a permanently kept concubine. The first defendant is the legitimate son of Chinnayya, a man of feeble intellect. The second defendant is his wife. The third defendant, who is the husband of Gangamma, a daughter of Chinnayya, claims to have been taken into the family of Chinnayya as his illatom son-in-law. This suit was tried in part with another suit filed by the third defendant, claiming an equal share in the property of Chinnayya with the legitimate son, the first defendant, on the basis of his adoption as an illatom son-in-law ; and a common judgment was delivered.

(2.) The principal questions tried in the suit were whether the plaintiff was a dasi putra, entitled to a half of the share of a legitimate son, and (2) whether the will, Ex. D-I, was true and valid. The learned Judge upheld the contention of the plaintiff that he was a dasi putra : but held that the will of Chinnayya was binding on the plaintiff and that he could be given nothing more than had been bequeathed to him under the will. In this Court, it is not denied that the plaintiff is the son -by the permanently kept concubine ; and so the only question remaining is whether the will, under which he was left a sum of Rs. 100 only, is binding on him.

(3.) As originally framed, there was no issue in this suit, as there was in the connected suit, whether the will was binding on the plaintiff; and it is argued that since the judge allowed such an issue to be framed at a very late stage, when the evidence was almost concluded, the plaintiff was not given a fair opportunity of combating the will. The two suits were however tried together ; and even at an earlier stage in the suit, when the learned Judge refused to add an additional issue relating to the will, because it was not then quite clear to him that the issue would be relevant, he stated that he might allow the issue to be raised at a later stage. Although the plaintiff objected to the examination of D.W. 4 to speak to the will; yet he at no time asked the Court for an adjournment in order to enable him to adduce the evidence to repel the evidence let in on the defendants side. Even in this Court, the learned Advocate for the plaintiff is unable to say that there are any witnesses whom he would have examined in the trial Court, had he been given a further opportunity. We are therefore of opinion that the appellant has not been prejudiced in any way by the procedure adopted by the learned District Judge.