PERAVALLI KOTAYYA Vs. PONNAPALLI RAMAKRISHNAYYA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) These civil revision petitions arise out of a batch of suits instituted by the Agraharamdars of Arepalli Taluk, Guntur District, against the tenants for recovery of rents or damages for use and occupation in respect of the holdings in their occupation. All the suits excepting one, namelyj O.S. No. 153 of 1918 were filed in the District Munsiff's Court of Repalli. The said O.S. No. 153 of 1918 was filed in the District Munsiff's Court of Tenali.

(2.) The main question in these suits is whether the Civil Court or the Revenue Court has jurisdiction to take cognisance of them. The allegations in the plaints are that the Agraha- ramdars own both the melwaram and the kudiwaram by virtue of the original grant and that at no time the tenants had occupancy rights. The plea of the tenants is that Arepalli Agraha-ram is an estate within the meaning of the Estates Land Act and their holdings being comprised in the said estate, the Revenue Court only has got jurisdiction to determine the claims. All the suits which were filed in the Repalli District Munsiff's Court were stayed pending the decision of the Privy Council relating to certain lands in the same agraharam wherein the same question was raised. The said O.S. No. 153 of 1918 reached the stage of second appeal and was pending in the High Court. The decision of the Privy Council was delivered on 14th February, 1929, and is reported in Seethayya V/s. Subra-mania Somayajulu (1929) 56. M.LJ.,730: L.R. 56 IA. 146: I.L.R. 52 Mad. 453 (P.C.). On a consideration of the original grant, their Lordships of the Judicial Committee held that the Arepalli Agraharam was an estate within the meaning of Section 3, Clause 2 (d) of the Madras Estates Land Act. After the decision of the Privy Council the suits in the District Munsiff's Court of Repalli were taken up for hearing and the plaints were directed to be returned for presentation to the proper Revenue Court. There was an appeal to the District Court from this decision. The learned District Judge was of opinion that though on the question of the construction of the grant the Privy Council decision was conclusive of the rights of the parties, the plaintiffs will nevertheless be entitled to allege and prove that they had acquired the kudiwaram right in the said lands subsequent to the date of grant. He therefore permitted the said contention to be raised and remanded the suits for disposal in the light of the observations contained in his judgment. It may be noticed the same view was taken in S.A. No, 1088 of 1921 which was filed against the appellate decision in O.S. No. 153 of 1918 and the said suit was also remanded for a laik purpose The District Munsiff on remand in a very careful and considered judgment came to the conclusion that the Agraharamdars did not acquire kudiwaram interest subsequent to the grant and the Revenue Court alone had jurisdiction. But his decision was reversed by the learned District Judge. It is against his decision these revision petitions were preferred in 22 of the suits. Since the filing of these revision petitions it has been brought to my notice that 10 of them have been compromised, namely, the following C.R.P. Nos. 971, 973, 979, 980, 982, 988, 989, 990, 991 and 992 of 1934. Therefore the main question which falls to be decided is whether the Agraharamdars own both the warams by reason of the subsequent acquisition of kudiwaram and the Civil Court has jurisdiction to try the suits. Mr. Satyanarayana Rao who appeared for the petitioners urged that it is unnecessary to go into the merits of these cases on the ground that under the Madras Act (XVIII of 1936) which amended the Madras Estates Land Act they have acquired occupancy rights and the kudiwaram is no longer in the Agraharamdars and the Revenue Court alone has got jurisdiction. It seems to me that this contention must prevail. Section 3 of the said Act has now added the following explanation to Section 6 of the Madras Estates Land Act (I of 1908): In relation to any inam village which was not an estate before the commencement of the Madras Estates Land (Third Amendment) Act, 1936, but became an estate by virtue of that Act, or in relation to any land in an inam village which ceased to be part of an estate before the commencement of that Act, the expressions now and commencement of this Act in this sub-section and Explanation (1) shall be construed as meaning the thirtieth day of June, 1934, and the expression hereafter in this sub-section shall be construed as meaning the period after the thirtieth day of June, 1934.

(3.) So far as Section 6 of the Act is concerned, it has been held to be retrospective in this sense, namely, that on the date of the commencement of the Act if a tenant was in possession of ryoti land, he would acquire occupancy right and the section has been applied to pending litigations where decrees in ejectments had been obtained but no final decree of a competent Court had been passed. In the order of the Reference to the Full Bench in Kanakayya v. Janardhana Padhi (1910) 21 M.L.J. 31: I.L.R. 36 Mad. 439 (F.B.) Miller and Krishnaswamy Ayyar, JJ., made the following observations in regard to the expression every ryot now in possession in the section: