GAINDA LAL GOEL Vs. RAMESHWAR DAS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application for revision of an order passed by the Additional Civil Judge of Muzaffarnagar dated 21 August 1936 directing that a certain award should be filed and a decree should be drawn up in accordance with such award. The parties to this application had entered into a series of contracts relating to grain. In respect Of each contract the present applicant signed a client's contract form and in each of those forms there appeared the following clause: In the event of any dispute arising between you and me out of this transaction I agree to put the matter to arbitration as provided by the bye-laws of the Jain Sanatan Sikh Grain Chamber Limited and to abide by the arbitration award.

(2.) On the back of the contract form are printed extracts from the bye-laws of the said Jain Sanatan Sikh Grain Chamber, Ltd., and in those bye-laws it is provided that should one of the disputing parties appoint an arbitrator and the other refuse or neglect to do so for 24 hours in Muzaffarnagar or 72 hours elsewhere in India, after receipt of notice in writing of the appointment, the question in dispute should upon application of either of the disputing parties stand referred to two arbitrators to be nominated by the Chairman of the Board. It appears that a dispute arose between the parties relating to these contracts and the opposite party nominated his arbitrator and called upon the present applicant to nominate his. The applicant failed so to do and in due course the matter was referred to arbitration as provided by the rules which I have cited which have been framed to meet such an eventuality. The applicant failed to appear before the arbitrators but they conducted the arbitration and in due course made an award in favour of the opposite party.

(3.) Application was made to the learned Munsif of Muzaffarnagar to file the award under Para. 20, Schedule 2, Civil P.C., but this application was rejected. On appeal to the learned Civil Judge the order of the learned Munsif was reversed and an order passed directing that the award be filed and that a decree be prepared in terms of the award. It is against this order of the appellate Court that this application in revision is directed. It has been argued in the first place by counsel for the applicant that the opposite party which is a firm is a partnership firm and is not registered. That being so, it is contended that it is precluded by Section 69, Partnership Act, from bringing any proceedings to enforce its rights. The lower Court has considered this aspect of the case and has come to the conclusion that the firm Chandu Lal Rameshwar Das is a joint family firm and not a partnership firm. A joint family firm need not be registered and is not subject to the restrictions imposed by Section 69, Partnership Act. It appears to me that there was ample evidence before the learned Civil Judge upon which he could find that this was a family firm. The second and main point taken before me is that the contract between the parties referring their disputes to arbitration was illegal and unenforceable by reason of Section 28, Contract Act. That section reads a3 follows: Every agreement, by which any party thereto is restricted absolutely from enforcing his rights under or in respect of any contract by the usual legal proceedings in the ordinary tribunals, or which limits, the time within which he may thus enforce his rights, is void to that extent.