(1.) The question referred to the Full Bench is, whether succession to a Hindu male dying before the passing of Act II of 1929, leaving a female heir (a limited owner under the law) who is alive after the Act has come into force, is governed by the provisions of that Act. The last male holder was one Venkatakrishna, who died a minor on the 11 July, 1927. He was succeeded by his mother, Lakshmi Ammal (the first defendant) against whom the. action has been brought by the plaintiffs claiming to be the presumptive reversioners, with a view to obtain certain reliefs in regard to her deceased son's estate. The plaintiffs right is challenged by the sister of Venkatakrishna, Sundarathammal (the second defendant in the suit) and her son, who allege that under the Act, they have a preferential right to the succession; and if this contention is well founded, the plaintiffs would cease to be the nearest or presumptive reversioners. Act II of 1929 received the assent of the Governor-General on the 21st February, 1929, on which date it came into force. The short question to be decided is, whether the succession to Venkatakrishna, who died before the Act leaving his mother as his immediate heir, is governed by that Act or by the law in force previously. This in turn depends upon the question, when does the succession to a Hindu male open?
(2.) This Act, as its preamble shows, has been passed with a view to alter the order of succession to a Hindu male dying intestate. In the present case, if Venkatakrishna, who was succeeded by his mother, is to be deemed as having died in 1927, the provisions of this Act, can have no operation. But the true principle seems to be, that under the Hindu Law, it is the death of the female heir that opens the inheritance to the reversioners, who till then possess an inchoate right, generally termed a spes successionis; in other words, the male holder is regarded by the law as having lived up to and died at the moment of the death of the female heir. When a female heir intervenes therefore, the fictional death of a Hindu male is something different from his actual death, the result being that the date of his death is for this purpose postponed to the death of the limited owner. If this principle is kept in mind, the question presents no difficulty. It would be begging the question to say that to adopt this view would be to give retrospective effect to the Act. If a male intestate succeeded: by a female heir is assumed as dying on the day of his actual death, which happens to be before the Act, to apply the provisions of this enactment to such a person would undoubtedly amount to giving it retrospective effect. But the true doctrine of the Hindu Law is thus declared by their Lordships of the Judicial Committee: The succession does not open to the heirs of the husband until the termination of the widow's estate. Upon the termination of that estate the property descends to those who would have been the heirs of the husband, if he had lived up to and died at the moment of her death". (Moniram Kolita V/s. Keri Kolitani (1880) L.R. 7 I.A. 115 at 154: I.L.R. 5 Cal. 776 (P.C.).)
(3.) The position of a Hindu widow or other female heirs is an anomalous one, for, although she is said to possess a qualified interest, she can in certain circumstances alienate the entire estate. That she is thus in one sense the heir of the last male holder, cannot be disputed. Referring to the widow, their Lordships say that what she holds is " an estate of inheritance to herself and the heirs of her husband". (Moniram Kolita V/s. KeriKolitani (1880) L.R. 7 I.A. 115 at 154: I.L.R. 5 Cal. 776 (P.C.).) The persons described here as the heirs of the last male holder are the reversioners, whose interests, so long as the female holder is alive is only contingent, " differentiated little, if at all, from a spes successionis". (Janaki Ammal V/s. Narayanasami Aiyar (1916) 31 M.L.J. 225: L.R. 43 I.A. 207 at 209: I.L.R. 39 Mad. 634 (P.C.).) The case last cited is an instructive one. There, the Courts in India declared the plaintiffs to be the nearest reversionary heirs of the deceased Ramaswami Aiyar, after the lifetime of defendants Nos. 1 and 2, his widow and mother. Their Lordships of the Judicial Committee held that such a declaration was both unavailing and premature, for, as they point out: The question of who is the nearest reversionary heir or what is the class of reversionary heirs, falls to be settled at the date of the expiry of the ownership for life or lives--that is to say, in the present case, at the death of the survivor of the appellant and her late husband's mother.