(1.) This is an appeal against the decision of the Subordinate Judge who has dismissed their objection against an execution as being barred by limitation. The litigation was instituted by Bibi Azizan, a Mahomedan widow, claiming her dower, and in the High Court she obtained by consent a decree giving her ten-sixteenths share and the defendants six-sixteenths share in the estate of Abdur Rahman with a direction that it should be ascertained through a commissioner what properties were comprised in the estate and that a partition of the properties should be made. Preliminary decree was passed by the lower Court on 29 March 1933, and coupled with it was an order for Rs. 295-4-3 to be paid by the judgment-debtors to the decree-holders plaintiffs on account of costs of the proceedings before the commissioner.
(2.) Thereafter the proceedings were continued for partition of the properties and final decree was passed disposing of the whole suit on 27 February 1938. The execution with which we are concerned was instituted on 20 April 1936, and the prayer is to execute the order for costs amounting to Rs. 295-4-3 which was passed on 29 March 1933. The objection is that a period of more than three years has elapsed since that order for costs was passed. The reply of the Subordinate Judge to this objection is that time must be considered to run from the date of the final decree.
(3.) In Art. 182, Lim. Act, para. 1, the date of the decree or order is the starting point of limitation for execution of a decree or order of any Civil Court save as provided by Art. 183 or by Section 48, which are not applicable. Decisions have been cited before us in which it has been held that the final decree was one complete and entire thing, and that limitation for its execution in respect of anything directed in it runs from the date of the final decree.