NAJMUNNISSA BEGUM Vs. SIRAJUDDIN AHMAD KHAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The suit out of which this appeal has arisen was instituted by a Mahomedan lady, the appellant before us, for recovery from the defendants of Rs. 5015, the amount of her prompt dower fixed at the time of her marriage with defendant 1 on 8 October 1925. She also sued for recovery of certain properties belonging to her which were kept back from her by her husband and his father, defendant 2. The defence was that though the dower was fixed at Rs. 5000 and one gold mohur prompt it was not an unconditional dower. The defendants alleged that the dower was fixed on the condition that the paternal and maternal relations of the lady would give her jewellery worth Rs. 2000 and also to defendant 1 presents worth Rs. 1000, but that the Marriage Registrar, who happened to be a maternal grandfather of the lady, did not enter these terms in the register on the pretext that there was no column for such entry and that those terms were independent contracts. They further alleged that as the lady's relations did not carry out the promise they had made at the time of the marriage, relations between them and defendant 1 became somewhat estranged and consequently the plaintiffs of her own free will executed an ekrarnama, dated 19 July 1926 whereby she surrendered Rs. 3000 out of the Rs. 5000 odd of the prompt dower fixed at the time of the marriage, and made it a deferred dower instead of a prompt one.

(2.) The learned Subordinate Judge has held that though there was some promise about giving jewellery to the lady and some presents to defendant 1 non-fulfilment of those promises did not affect the amount of the dower fixed at the marriage but he dismissed the suit for dower giving effect to the terms of the ekrarnama of 1926 relied upon by the defendants. He gave the plaintiff a decree for the value of some articles claimed by her.

(3.) Now the ekrarnama relied upon by the defendants was challenged on behalf of the plaintiff among others on the ground that at the time of its execution she was below 18 years of age and had not attained majority under the Majority Act. In reply to this the defendants relied on Section 2 of the Act and contended that for purposes of relinquishing a part of the dower the age of majority would be according to the personal law of the lady and not according to the Majority Act. This contention of the defendants prevailed in the lower Court. The plaintiff has therefore preferred this appeal. The learned advocate for the respondents has not challenged the finding of the lower Court that the age of the plaintiff on the date of the ekrarnama was II years and 2 months, and it must be taken that at the time she was a minor under the Majority Act. The only question which remains to be decided is whether the ekrarnama of 1926 by which the plaintiff purported to relinquish her claim for dower is valid or whether it is void. Now Section 2, Majority Act, while fixing the age of majority at 18 years in ordinary cases and at 21 years where a guardian of the person or property of the minor has been appointed, or his estate has been taken charge of by the Court of Wards , provides that nothing herein contained shall affect the capacity of any person to act in the following matters (namely) marriage, dower, divorce and adoption.