PIRU PRAMANIK Vs. PABNA DHANABHANDAR CO LTD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The eight analogous Rules arise out of as many suits for rent which involved certain common questions of law and fact and were tried together in both the Courts below. In one of these rent suits, namely, Rent Suit No. 2616 of 1934, the plaintiffs are the two Banks,-the Pabna Dhanabhandar Co., Ltd. and the Pabna Bank Ltd. and certain other persons who may be called the Pakrashis and all these plaintiffs jointly represent the entire putni interest in mouza Suratali in the district of Pabna. The rent claimed was for lands held by the defendants in the suit within the said mouza. In the other seven suits one Himangshu Jyoti Majumdar figured as the plaintiff and he claimed to recover rents from the tenants-defendants in respect of lands held by them in the same Mouza Suratali on the basis of his rights as a darputnidar in the mouza under the putnidars mentioned above. The defence taken by the tenants in all these suits raised a common point which turns upon the question as to whether the darputni interest claimed by Himangshu and on the basis of which he instituted the seven suits had any legal existence.

(2.) The contention of the tenants in these seven suits was that this darputni which was alleged to be held by the mother of Himangshu under his father as putnidar was a collusive and benami affair and that in any event it ceased to exist after the sale of the putni interest. If this darputni interest was not subsisting, Himangshu obviously would not have any right to realize rent from the tenants who would be bound to pay rent to the putnidars direct. Curiously enough, the defence taken by the tenants in suit No. 2616 of 1934 where the putnidars were the plaintiffs was just the opposite and it was contended that the putnidars had no right to sue inasmuch as the darputni of Himangshu was still subsisting and rents were payable to the latter. It may be mentioned here that Himangshu was not a party to Rent Suit No. 2616 of 1934 and the plaintiffs in that suit were not impleaded as defendants in the seven suits of Himangshu. The trial Court came to the conclusion that the darputni interest of Himangshu was a valid thing and was not annulled by the putni sale and consequently the putnidars were not entitled to sue the tenants for rent. On this finding the Munsif dismissed Rent Suit No. 2616 of 1934 and decreed the other seven suits in which Himangshu was the plaintiff. The judgment is dated 15 June 1935.

(3.) Against these decrees there were eight appeals taken to the District Judge of Pabna. It may be stated that all these suits were valued at less than Rs. 50 and the munsif who decided them was invested with final powers under Section 153, Ben. Ten. Act. It is also not disputed that no question was raised or decided in these suits which could make the appeals competent under the provisions of that section. No such objection was, however, taken by the respondents to the appeals and the learned District Judge heard these appeals in the ordinary way and being of opinion that the questions of merger and annulment of the darputni interest were not properly decided, sent the case back for re-hearing on fuller materials. The cases were re-heard by the trial Court and judgment delivered on 25 November 1935. The Munsif decided the question of merger against Himangshu and held that the darputni interest merged in the superior putni right when Himangshu himself held both these interests after the death of his parents. Consequently, when the putni was sold there was no subsistence of the darputni interest. On this view of the case the munsif dismissed the seven suits of Himangshu and decreed the other suits where the putnidars were the plaintiffs. Against these decrees again there were appeals preferred to the Court of the District Judge of Pabna, and objection was now taken by the respondents, who were appellants on the previous occasion, that the appeals were incompetent. The Judge agreeing to the contention treated them as petitions of revision under the proviso to Section 153, Ben. Ten. Act, but in the end refused to interfere observing that the entertainment of the appeals on the previous occasion which were not entertainable in law without an objection from the other side had led to certain anomalous results, and this Court was the only proper Court which could end the tangle and adjust the rights of the parties.