NEELAMEGHAM PILLAI Vs. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The appellant who had been appointed Income Tax Officer in June 1922 was dismissed from service by an order of the Commissioner, dated June 22, 1922. He filed this suit for damages, contending that order of dismissal was illegal, void and ultra vires.

(2.) The validity of the order was challenged on two grounds (1) that the Commissioner did not hold a proper enquiry before passing the order of dismissal and (2) that in view of the provisions of Section 96-B of the Government of India Act, 1919, the Commissioner was not competent to pass the order of dismissal. Before the lower Court the first of the above contentions was advanced on the assumption that the plaintiff could have been dismissed only after enquiry in the manner prescribed by Rule 14 of the Civil Service Classification Rules. The learned Subordinate Judge was of opinion that that rule was not applicable to persons appointed under the Income-tax Act of 1922. This question has now become immaterial, because, even assuming that the procedure prescribed by that rule or any other rule has not been followed, a Civil Court is not competent to give redress to a person on that ground, after the decision of the Privy Council in Venkata Rao V/s. Secretary of State for India. An argument was urged before us, on behalf of the appellant, that in that decision as well as in the connected case, their Lordships were only dealing with the nature of the tenure on which the Civil Servants in India hold their office and did not decide the question as to the cause of action available to a Civil Servant on the ground that in the matter of his dismissal the prescribed procedure had not been followe. We are unable to agree with that contention. The first question dealt with by them was no doubt the nature of the tenure; but having arrived at the conclusion that Civil Servants in this country hold their office to the pleasure of the Crown, their Lordships next did address themselves to the question of the effect of the reference in the opening part of Section 96-B to the rules made thereunder as qualifying th declaration of the tenure of the office. It is in dealing with this argument, that their Lordships say that while a solemn duty is laid upon the Government to observe these rules when dealing with the matter of the dismissal of an officer, the failure to decided on so will nevertheless not furnish a cause of action for a Civil Suit.

(3.) It was also contended before us, on the strength of passage in Mr. Sundarams book on the Law of Income-tax, that the Commissioner is subject to the control of the local Government as much in the matter of dismissing an Income-tax Officer as in the matter of appointing one. It was accordingly suggested that as the dismissal in this case did not appear to have been made with the previous approval of the Local Government, the dismissal was void in law. We propose to deal at some length with a cognate argument when dealing with the next contention of the appellant. We may, however, observe here that in the Devolution Rules specific provision has ben made in this connection only in raspect of the appointment of Assistant Commissioners and Income Tax Officers delegating the power of hte Governor- General in Council (formerly to the Governor in Council) to any Assistant Commissioner or Income-tax Officer who has been dismissed or removed from office by the Commissionr. The reference to a right of appeal is a clear indication that it could not have been contemplated that the dismissal should be with prior approval obtained from the same authority : it is only in respect of appointment that previous approval is referred to in the Devolution Rules.