(1.) The question that arises for consideration in the present application in revision is whether the sale of property in execution of a decree passed against a person in his capacity as a legal representative of a deceased person amounts to an act of insolvency within the meaning of Section 6(e), Insolvency Act, Act 5 of 1920. The question was answered in the negative by the Madras High Court in Nagasubrahmania Mudaliar V/s. Krishnamachariar (1927) 14 A.I.R. Mad. 922. It was held in that case that until there is a personal decree under Section 52, Civil P.C., a decree against a person as the legal representative of another does not make him liable to adjudication under the Provincial Insolvency Act. There are also certain observations in Baij Nath V/s. Gajadhar Prasad (1935) 22 A.I.R. Oudh 406 that are in consonance with the view taken by the Madras High Court. It is provided by Section 6(e), Insolvency Act, that: A debtor commits an act of insolvency, (e) if any of his property has been sold in execution of the decree of any Court for the payment of money.
(2.) It is contended in the present case on behalf of the petitioning creditor who is the opposite party before us that as the words of Clause (e) of Section 6 are general in terms the clause must be taken to cover even those cases in which a decree for the pay merit of money has been passed or is outstanding against a person in his capacity as the legal representative of a deceased debtor. In this connection it is urged that there are no words of limitation in Clause (e) that can warrant the interpretation put upon that clause by the Madras High Court. In our judgment the contention advanced on behalf of the opposite party is without substance. A perusal of Section 6, Insolvency Act, puts it beyond doubt that the acts of insolvency referred to in Clauses (a), (b), (o), (d), (f) and (g) of that section refer to voluntary acts by the debtor and those voluntary acts amount to the commission of an act of insolvency by him. The only other sub-clauses of that section that remain for consideration are Clauses (e) and (h). Sub-clause (e) has already been quoted above. Clause (h) runs as follows : "If he is imprisoned in execution of the decree of any Court for the payment of money".
(3.) Clause (e) and Clause (h) do not refer to acts done by the debtor of his own volition but have reference to enforcement of processes in execution of decrees by execution Courts. It is however apparent that both the said clauses have application only to decrees "for the payment of money". At the phrase "for the payment of money" has been used in both Clauses (e) and (h), the phrase must be given a similar meaning in both the clauses. It is manifest that a debtor can be imprisoned in execution of a decree for payment of money only if he is personally liable for the decretal amount and not in execution of a decree which ho is liable to pay in his capacity as the legal representative of a deceased debtor. In Clause (h) the words "for the payment of money" must therefore be interpreted as meaning "decrees that are personally enforceable against the judgment-debtor". That being so, the same interpretation must be put on that phrase in Clause (e). It is one of the recognized canons of construction that the words used in a statute must be given similar meanings unless such an interpretation leads to obvious anomalies or absurdities.