BHAGAT RAJ Vs. MTGURAI DULAIYA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a second appeal arising out of a suit for damages for malicious prosecution. The suit was dismissed by the Court which tried it. There was an appeal to the lower Appellate Court which went only into the preliminary question whether the suit was barred by limitation. It held that the suit was so barred and dismissed the appeal under the provisions of Order 41, Rule 11, Civil P.C. In order to understand the question at issue it is necessary to know that the suit was instituted because a complaint had been made against the plaintiff under Section 107, Criminal P.C., on 20 August 1932. The learned Magistrate made an inquiry and came to the conclusion that there was no sufficient ground to bind the plaintiff over. He therefore passed an order on 12 November 1932 that the accused should be "acquitted". The person making the complaint then filed an application in revision in the Court of the Sessions Judge and this was dismissed on 9th January 1933. The suit which has given rise to this appeal was instituted on 8th January 1934. It is obvious that the suit was barred by limitation if the period of limitation began to run from 12 November 1932, but that it was not so barred if the period began to run from 9 January 1933. The rule of limitation is to be found in Art. 23 of Schedule 1, Lim. Act. It is there said that the period of limitation for suits for compensation for malicious prosecution shall be one year from the date when the plaintiff is acquitted or the prosecution is otherwise terminated.

(2.) The argument of the learned Judge of the lower Appellate Court was that the plaintiff had been acquitted and therefore the period of limitation began to run from the date of acquittal, i.e. from 12 November 1932. He was influenced by some expressions used in Madan Mohan Singh V/s. Ram Sunder Singh . The decision in that case was that the period of limitation for a suit for malicious prosecution ran from the date when the prosecution was terminated and in that case the prosecution finally terminated when the application in revision was dismissed. It was a case where there had been a complaint under Section 500, I.P.C., where there had been a discharge and an application before the Sessions Judge that be should direct a further inquiry under the provisions of Section 436, Criminal P.C. Toe decision in Narayan V/s. Seshayya (1900) 23 Mad. 24 was quoted in the course of argument. The learned Judges in deciding the case pointed out that the judgment in Narayan V/s. Seshayya (1900) 23 Mad. 24 was very brief and that no detailed reasons were given. They also went on to say that that case might possibly be distinguished upon two grounds, one that the District Magistrate himself had no right to order a further inquiry in that case and the other that it was a case where there was an acquittal and not a discharge. There is the following passage in the judgment: Moreover in a case where the prosecution ended in acquittal, the language of Art. 23 leaves no room for argument, as it provides specifically that limitation is to run from the date of acquittal. It is not therefore necessary to consider whether the prosecution terminated .

(3.) It must be remembered that these remarks were made merely as a suggestion that the case in Narayan V/s. Seshayya (1900) 23 Mad. 24 might be distinguishable. The question whether the provisions of Art. 23 of Schedule 1, Lim. Act, were to the effect that the period of limitation for a suit for damages for malicious prosecution should begin on the date of the acquittal and at no later date when the plaintiff bad been acquitted, did not really arise. It is possible that the proper interpretation to be placed on the provision of Art. 23 is that the period of limitation begins to run when the plaintiff is acquitted or the prosecution is otherwise terminated whichever date may be later. In the very case in Madan Mohan Singh V/s. Ram Sunder Singh the ease of a Government appeal from an acquittal as an illustration was mentioned. It was said that: The order of acquittal terminates the prosecution for the time being. The filing of an appeal does not ipso facto vacate that order: and yet while the appeal is pending it can hardly be said that the prosecution has terminated.