(1.) This is an application against an order passed by the Subdivisional Magistrate of Gaya under Section 145, Criminal P.C., declaring the second party to the proceedings to be in possession of about 50 bighas of land in village Bhindaspur. The history of the case is briefly as follows: The first party is the landlord Babu Chandeshwar Prasad Narayan Singh together with one of his patwaris. The first party sold raiyati holdings of about 200 bighas in area under rent decrees and obtained delivery of possession in the years 1933 and 1934. In 1935 there was a Section 144 case about these lands in which notices were confirmed against the tenants concerned. In March 1936 there was a further trouble and a report was submitted for binding down the tenants under Section 107, Criminal P.C. On that occasion the Subdivisional Magistrate intervened, and the landlord agreed under certain conditions about which it is not necessary for me to comment, to return about 50 bighas out of the lands sold to certain of the tenants. The case of the first party is that out of the remaining 150 bighas, one hundred was left for rabi and 50 bighas, which are the subject matter of the present dispute, were sown with paddy. There was some disturbance at the time of harvesting the crop, and the Sub-Inspector went to the spot. He reported for action under Section 144 against the second party, but the Subdivisional Magistrate having drawn up proceedings under Section 145 found the second party to be in possession of the land. The District Magistrate declined to refer the case to this Court, and the first party has now come to this Court direct.
(2.) Mr. Rajkishore Prasad for the second party contended that this Court is bound by the findings of fact arrived at by the trial Court and has no jurisdiction to interfere. This Court, however, has pointed out in a number of oases that the Criminal Court is bound to support persons placed in possession of property by the civil Court and whose possession has been wrongfully disturbed. In this case it is admitted that the first party got possession of the disputed plots through the Civil Court, and it is for the second party to show that they subsequently came into possession by some lawful means. It therefore goes very much against the second party that when the Sub-Inspector went to the spot in December last, they chose to disclaim all concern with the land. Even in the written statement filed in the Section 145 case, the second party were content with a bare assertion of the possession of themselves and other persons not included in the present proceedings, with no suggestion as to how and when they came to acquire possession. It is not till the evidence stage that the second party suggested that they received verbal permission from the first party's manager to cultivate the lands and that they accordingly grew the crops. This suggestion was denied by the manager and was not accepted by the learned Magistrate himself. The Magistrate decided in favour of the second party largely on the strength of certain rent receipts which were not brought on to the record, but according to the first party were granted to tenants by the manager for amounts claimed to have been paid by them, which were set off against rents which had subsequently become due. The learned Magistrate surmised that having been granted these receipts, the tenants might have thought that their dues had been satisfied and that owing to this misunderstanding they cultivated the lands. It was not open to the Magistrate to decide the case on a speculation of this character which was not the case of either party before him. Moreover, the Magistrate made a mistake of law in supposing that he was only bound to look into events occurring within two months of the date when the proceedings were drawn up. The Magistrate should have considered the whole history of the dispute from the date when the first party was put in possession by the Civil Court, and his failure to do so has vitiated his findings. Even supposing that the second party were able to commit certain acts of trespass on the lands, that does not establish their right to an order in their favour under Section 145.
(3.) For these reasons I am unable to support the learned Magistrate's order, and find that the first party is in possession under decree of the Civil Court, and that their possession must be maintained. I accordingly allow this application and declare the first party to be in possession of the disputed lands.