THALAYUR NARAYANAN MOOSSAD Vs. MAMMADISSA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This second appeal arises out of a suit in ejectment by a jenmi. The suit was instituted before the enactment of the Malabar Tenancy Act, as the term of the lease had expired by the date of the suit. As the case had not been disposed of before the Act came into force, the tenant thought fit to file I.A. 521 of 1931 praying for a renewal. Section 23, Tenancy Act provides that when such an application is filed, the landlord shall be asked to state whether he desires to evict the tenant on any of the grounds referred to in Section 20 except ground No. 3, i.e. the ground based on expiry of the term; and if the landlord expresses his intention to do so, the section directs that the application of the tenant shall be dismissed. In this case, the plaintiff when he received notice Under Section 22, amended his plaint by stating that he proposed to rely upon Clauses 2 and 5 of Section 20 relating to acts of waste by the tenant and bona fide requirement of the land by the landlord for his own cultivation. The District Munsif followed the strict letter of Section 23 and dismissed the tenant's application.

(2.) When the suit came on for trial, the Court found that the landlord did not succeed in making out either the ground Under Clause 2 or the ground Under Clause 5 of Section 20 and accordingly it dismissed the suit. On appeal, it appears from the judgment of the learned District Judge that the ground of waste was not pressed before him; and on the other ground, viz. that Under Clause 5, the learned District Judge confirmed the finding of the trial Court. Hence this second appeal by the landlord. Before me, Mr. Kuttikrishna Menon tried to re- agitate the plaintiff's case Under Clause 2, but in view of the definite statement in the judgment of the lower Appellate Court, I am not prepared to permit that question to be re- opened.

(3.) As regards the case Under Clause 5, I see no reason to disturb the finding; but Mr. Kuttikrishna Menon argues that the Court has really no power to investigate the truth or otherwise of an allegation made by the landlord Under Clause 5. Reading Clauses 3, 5 and 6 of Section 20, his contention is that Clause 5 and 6 can only mean that if once the landlord says that he wants the land for his own purpose, there is an end of the matter. Mr. Kuttikrishna Menon is of course right in pointing out that there is very little difference between the condition imposed by Clause 3 and the condition imposed by Clauses 5 and 6 so far as the right to eject is concerned, viz. the expiry of the term. The only difference can therefore be according to him the additional allegation by the landlord in the terms referred to in Clauses 5 and 6. This construction, I think, will practically defeat the purpose of these provisions and give no effect whatever to the use of the words bona fide in Cluases. 5 and 6. These words, if they have any significance at all, must mean that the Court must be satisfied that the assertion made by the landlord as regards his own requirement of the land is a bona fide assertion.