(1.) This appeal is directed against an order of the learned District Judge of Darbhanga dismissing an appeal of the reversioners from an order passed against them by the learned Munsif refusing their objection under Section 47, Civil P.C., to the execution of a decree under the following circumstances.
(2.) It appears that the opposite party obtained a money decree against one Mt. Manrup Kuer after the death of her husband and proceeded to execute the decree against certain properties of the husband. This execution was resisted by the reversioners on the plea that the debt which was the foundation of the decree did not bind the estate. The executing Court upheld the objection and dismissed the execution then levied on the ground that the decree was a personal decree against the widow and did not bind the estate of the husband. Thereupon the decree- holder started another execution (which has given rise to this appeal) against a certain house on the allegation that this house was the personal property of the widow. The reversioners appellants again objected by means of an application under Section 47, Civil P.C., alleging that this house, although purchased by the widow from the earnings of the husband's estate in her possession, was an accretion to the husband's estate and therefore could not be seized in execution. The learned Munsif who first heard the objection has held upon a consideration of all the evidence adduced in the case that the Musammah was over-anxious to show to the world that the property was her own and was quite unconnected with the corpus of her husband's estate, and be concluded that: I cannot but infer that the property in question was kept quite separate and distinct by Mt. Manrup Kuer from the corpus of her husband's estate, that it was her indention that it should be so kept and that she never intended that it should form an accretion to her husband's estate.
(3.) The learned District Judge of Darbhanga in disposing of an appeal from this order has arrived at exactly the same findings. He has given convincing reasons to hold that: There was hence a dear intention on her part to have this house as her personal property and it cannot, after her death, merge in the reversionary estate, simply because she left it as her house and did not assign it in her lifetime to anybody else.