SRI RAJAH VIJIYA APPARAO SAVAI ASWARAO BAHADUR ZAMINDAR GARU Vs. SECRETARY OF STATE FOR INDIA IN COUNCIL, REPRESENTED BY THE GOVERNMENT AGENT AND COLLECTOR

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The appellant is the superior proprietor of the Bhadrachalam Estate; he filed the suit for a declaration that the assessment imposed on that estate for a period of 30 years from Fasli 1332 was ultra vires and illegal, as being in contravention of certain Government Orders of 1886 and 1922. The assessment itself was imposed in pursuance of G.O. No. 1373 dated 10th September, 1923 (Ex. V). It is this Government Order that directed the publication of the notification, which has been marked Ex. D in the case stating that a revision of the rates and conditions of assessment in the Bhadrachalam taluk will be carried out with effect from Fasli 1332, in accordance with the orders conveyed in G.O. No. 815 Rev., dated 5 May, 1922.

(2.) Ex. V shows that at the time of passing that order, the Government had before them a communication from the Board of Revenue dated 9 May, 1923. That apparently was the letter of the Board containing the revised statements called for in paragraph 11 of G.O. No. 815 dated 5 May, 1922 (Ex. C). There can thus be no doubt that the assessment which the plaintiff has been called upon to pay is the one which the Government actually sanctioned by their Government Order of September, 1923. If this is the true position on the facts, it is difficult to see how any civil suit will lie to question such assessment in the face of Section 58 of the Madras Revenue Recovery Act.

(3.) The principle laid down in Kelu Nair V/s. Secretary of State for India in Council will not avail the plaintiff in the circumstances of the present case. We do not therefore think it necessary to consider whether any observations in that judgment require any qualification. Assuming for the sake of argument that a notification in terms of Ex. D will give such a right to a landholder as will entitle him to maintain a suit to impeach any assessment made in contravention of that notification, there can be no doubt that the notification must be construed in the light of the whole Government Order of which it formed a part, and as we have already pointed out above, the assessment now imposed upon the plaintiff is the very assessment sanctioned by that Government Order.