MUNNA SINGH RAJPUT Vs. NARAIN SINGH

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE facts of this case are fully stated in the judgment of the first Court, by which the plaintiff's claim was dismissed. The learned District Judge, in dismissing the appeal held that it was permissible in the present case to prove that Mt. Gendibai alone was entitled to recover the amount in deposit under the receipt (P-1), and also dismissed the present plaintiffs appeal. He has now come up to this Court on second appeal.

(2.) THE first matter for decision is whether, in view of the terms of P-1, it was permissible for the lower Courts to hold that Gendibai alone without the present plaintiff was entitled to give a complete discharge for the amount in question. There has been some argument in this Court to the effect that the words o? the receipt do not necessarily, imply that Gendibai and the plaintiff were co-promisees; I will assume, however, that this was so. It has been urged strongly on behalf of the appellant that, in view of Section 92, Evidence Act, it was not permissible for the defendants to prove, or for the Courts to hold, that Gendibai could give alone a valid discharge as regards the amount covered by P-1. Section 92, Evidence Act, only lays down that in the case of a written contract: no evidence of any oral agreement or statement shall be admitted, as between the parties to the contract for the purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to, or subtracting from, its terms.

(3.) THE position in the present ease seems to me to be precisely analogous to that adumbrated in the second passage from their Lordships' judgment just; quoted. If the findings of the lower Courts on the questions of fact involved stand, viz. that this money was, in reality, Gendibai's and that at the time her husband was fully aware of this and never attempted to contest the fact, then it seems to me obvious that in the circumstances of the present case, it is open to this Court to take into codsideration the evidence which has been produced on behalf of the defendant--version of the circumstances under which P-1 was executed. I do not think there is any necessity to have recourse, as the learned District Judge did, to the analogy of a benami transaction. The analogy may exist, but, at the best, it is a vague and imperfect one. It has, however, been urged before me that the lower appellate Court was incorrect in holding that the money in question was in reality. Gendibai's own property. This money, it has been argued, represents the sale-proceeds of the field of Gendibai's father. Gendibai has a son alive and she is now residing with the plaintiff. It is suggested, therefore, that she has only a life-interest in the money and that, in the circumstances, it 'is incorrect to hold that the money was Gendibai's sole and absolute property.