LAWS(PVC)-1927-2-56

GANGADHAR BALVANT OKE Vs. COLLECTOR OF NASIK

Decided On February 22, 1927
GANGADHAR BALVANT OKE Appellant
V/S
COLLECTOR OF NASIK Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a suit relating to the village of Pimpalgaon-Bahula in the Nasik District. The plaintiff sues for a declaration against the Secretary of State that he has the right of receiving the income of two survey numbers in the village, Nos. 103 and 106, which are described as waste pasture land, and for a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from taking the income of the suit lands. His suit has been dismissed by the District Judge of Nasik and he appeals from that decision. Undoubtedly, the plaintiff has certain Inam rights in this village. The main dispute is as to the extent of those rights. I think the case really rests in a narrow compass. The plaintiff's case is based upon a Sanad that was issued to him, under Bombay Act II of 1863, in 1893. The contention is that, whatever may have been his rights under a certain adjudication by the Inam Commissioner in 1860, he has by virtue of that Sanad full Inam rights in this village, subject to the restriction that the ordinary land revenue from the village has to be divided between him and Government in the proportions laid down by the Inam Commissioner's decision. On the other hand, the contention put forward for the Secretary of State is that that Sanad in no way affects the decision of the Inam Commissioner, except that it extends the right of succession by the limited male descent that was allowed by the Inam Commissioner's decision to the larger rights of succession that are mentioned in Bombay Act II of 1868, This, in my opinion, covers the main question which arises.

(2.) The decision of the Assistant Inam Commissioner was confirmed on appeal by the Inam Commissioner. That decision had, under Act XI of 1852, a final effect by virtue of the provisions of rule No. 2 of Schedule A to that Act. Under that rule, the proceedings of the Inam Commissioner were subject only to modification, reversal or annulment by the Governor of Bombay in Council, whose orders in every case were declared to be final. It has been ruled in Ramrav Govindrao V/s. Secretary of State (1909) I.L.R. 34 Bom. 232, s.c. 11 Bom. L.R. 1333 that this also implies the finality of the Inam Commissioner's order, if there has been no such modification, etc., by the Governor, That being so, we have to consider what was the effect of the issue of the Sanad in 1893. There is some evidence to show that in fact the Sanad of 1893 was not the first Sanad that was issued under the Act of 1863, and that another Sanad had been issued in about the year 1872. For instance, Exhibit 43, an extract from the Land Alienation Register of 1887-88, mentions that an entry in the Sanad which had been issued seemed to be erroneous, and that the matter of correcting it was under correspondence. That would clearly imply that a Sanad had been actually issued. Also there are some statements in a petition made by the plaintiff that confirm that supposition. But there is nothing in the evidence which suggests that that particular Sanad was in any way different to the Sanad that was subsequently issued, except that, possibly, the area of pot Inam entered in that Sanad was shown as 210 acres and 10 gunthas instead of the 210 acres and 11 gunthas that are shown in the Sanad, Exhibit 45. Therefore, the question, whether or not there was a previous Sanad, does not really affect the case.

(3.) The Sanad itself states that it was issued with reference to the provisions of Section 4 and Section 16, Clause (B) of Bombay Act II of 1863; and therefore in considering the circumstances under which this particular grant was made, it is first, in my opinion, essential to see exactly what Section 4 of the Act contemplated being done. The preamble to the Act makes it perfectly clear that the Act was passed mainly to provide for the final adjustment, summarily, of unsettled claims to exemption from the payment of land-revenue; and that is also a matter of history, because there is plenty of evidence that the Act was mainly due to the delay that had taken place in adjudications by the Inam Commission under the previous Act XI of 1852. Accordingly, Section 2 of the Act provides for the case of persons whoso title to exemption had not already been formally adjudicated, and provides for the lands being virtually granted as private property in perpetuity subject to certain annual payments to Government. Those payments were, in ordinary circumstances, first, a fixed annual Nazarana of one anna in the rupee of assessment, and, secondly, a quit-rent equal to one-fourth of the assessment. Certain rules were laid down for ascertaining the amount of assessment on which those annual payments should be calculated. Then we come to Section 4, which deals with the other ease of lands held partially or wholly exempt from the payment of land-revenue and already formally adjudicated to be so continuable hereditarily in perpetuity. In that case, it seems clear that the section contemplated a variation of the formal adjudication only in respect of one particular matter, namely, the devolution of the lands so exempt from payment of land-revenue not only to the actual descendants of the holder, to whom inheritance may have been limited by the terms of the adjudication, but also to all his legal successors by inheritance, including heirs by collateral succession and heirs by adoption, and their assigns. That is made clear, in my opinion, by the first paragraph of the section. The second paragraph is also on the same basis. It abrogates the right of Government or its officers to question the title to possession or to exemption from the payment of land-revenue on a particular ground, and that ground is that the person in possession does not belong to the family to which title was restricted by the adjudication. Thus, take the case of the plaintiff himself. He was adopted into this family. Under the adjudication of the Inam Commissioner, he would have had no title whatever to hold this land exempt from the payment of land-revenue, but by virtue of the provisions of this Section 4, he became entitled to them as heritable and transferable property in the ordinary way. Then we come to the third paragraph, and that provides for what is probably the consideration for this extended right of devolution. It says that the lands in question are henceforth to be held subject to the payment to Government of an annual Nazarana calculated at the rate of one anna for each rupee of assessment of the land, and that that Nazarana is to be in addition to the partial assessment, if any, ordered by the terms of the formal adjudication under which the land has been declared to be continuable. It will be seen that the payment that is to be given is considerably less than the payment that has to be given under Section 2. It provides for the Nazarana at the rate of one anna in the rupee, but it omits the liability to pay a portion of the quit-rent equal to one-fourth of the assessment. That supports the view I take of this section, because if it had been intended that the Sanad under Section 4 should have the same effect as a Sanad under Section 2, then why should less payment be taken in a case under Section 4 than is required in a case under Section 2 ? The Sanad, as I have already mentioned, refers to Clause (B) of Section 16, which says that "the word lands shall, for the purposes of this Act, be understood to include villages, portions of villages, shares of the revenues thereof, and landed estate of every description." That definition is in some ways more extensive than what the word "lands" would ordinarily imply; in another direction it is restricted. So far as the word "lands" can cover a whole village, it has an extensive meaning. On the other hand, so far as that word can be used merely to cover shares of the revenue of lands, it has a restricted meaning. Therefore, in the present case, though the Inamdar under the Inam Commissioner's decision had only a right to a share in the land-revenues of the village, this definition makes Section 4 applicable, although what was in issue were not actual lands, but merely a share in the revenues of those lands.