SHRIDHAR ANANT GANPULE Vs. GANU RAGHO GURAV

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal arises out of the decision in Sakharam V/s. Ganu (1920) 23 Bom. L.R. 125. In that case it was held that a suit brought by certain hereditary Pujaris of a temple near Chiplun against certain Guravs of the temple without compliance with the provisions of Section 92 of the Civil Procedure Code was barred by that section; but it was held that the dispute, which related to the respective rights of the parties to certain offerings at the temple, might be made the subject of an application to the District Court. This was in view of a scheme that had been framed for the management of this temple by a Devasthan Committee. At p. 128 a reference is made to Clause (2) of that scheme, under which the members of that Committee were to conduct the affairs of the Devasthan according to the long established usages thereof, and it is mentioned that the scheme contained no specific reservation for any application to add to, or alter the scheme. But at P. 132 the judgment says that, though no liberty to apply is reserved under the scheme, such a reservation could be implied. Shah J., with whom Crump J. agreed, accordingly held that the only remedy open to the parties under the circumstances was to have a direction from the District Court as to the offerings laid before the deity. It is also said that it is open to any one interested in the trust-fund to apply to the District Court, which framed the scheme, to supplement or modify the same. Again it is said that the respective rights of the parties was a matter which must be decided on evidence by the District Court on a proper application. Accordingly, an application was made to the District Court by the Pujaris against the Guravs. The District Judge, after hearing the parties, decided that the offerings should be divided in the proportion of sis to five between the Pujaris and the Guravs. An appeal against this decision was admitted by the Honourable Mr. Justice Coyajee on October 22, 1923. When the case first came on for hearing, it was adjourned in order that the members of the Devasthan Committee might also be joined as parties. This has been done and we have now heard all the parties to the appeal.

(2.) A preliminary objection has been taken by Mr. Shingne for the Guravs that no appeal lies from the decision of the District Judge. This is based upon the ruling of the Privy Council in the Dakore Temple case, Jeranchod Vs. Dakore Temple Committee . Mr. Kane for the appellants contends that the order of the District Judge is one really relating to execution of the decree which laid down the scheme, and that it therefore falls under Section 47 of the Civil Procedure Code. If that is so, then, undoubtedly, an appeal would lie to this Court. Mr. Gharpure for the Devasthan Commitee supports Mr. Shingne's contention that no appeal lies.

(3.) This case, undoubtedly, differs in some respects from that which was before their Lordships of the Privy Council in the Dakore Temple case (Jeranchod v. Dakore Temple Committee . In that case the scheme contained a distinct provision that certain rules should, when sanctioned by the District Court, have the same force as if they were part of the scheme. Accordingly, it was held that the rules when so sanctioned had final effect as part of the scheme and that no appeal lay to the High Court. The only power which this Court had was that conferred upon it by another clause of the scheme, under which it could, on an application, alter, modify or add to the scheme. That, however, was a power that had not, in fact, been exercised. On the other hand, the scheme in this case does undoubtedly contemplate that there should be some control by the District Judge in regard to the management of the temple. Thus under Clause (3) there has to be an annual audit of the accounts by an auditor appointed by the Subordinate Judge of Chiplun, and the auditor has to submit a report to the Subordinate Judge, who in turn has to transmit it with his remarks, if any, to the District Judge, who may file it or take such steps upon it as he thinks fit. There is, no doubt, no similar provision in regard to control of the District Judge in matters other than accounts, except as to the filling up of vacancies in the Devasthan Committee, which under Clause (1) has to be done by the District Judge after consulting the Subordinate Judge of Chiplun and certain other persons. But the scheme does, in my opinion, imply that the District Judge was also to exercise control generally in regard to any question of management that might properly be brought before him; and the judgment of the District Judge, which provides for the scheme (Exhbit 127) states that it merely embodies all the matters on which it appeared "at present" necessary to give directions. The District Judge obviously contemplated that they might require supplementing in future.