SURAVARAPU VENKATA SUBRAMANYA SASTRI Vs. YALLA BHIRAVASWAMI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal raises a question of limitation. Ex. D is a cowle deed executed on 2nd May, 1891, which was to operate for a period of 16 years. The suit was filed on 2nd May, 1919. The District Munsif found that it was in time. The Sub-Judge in first appeal was of opinion that the lease expired at the end of the year Parabhava--about 13 April, 1917--and held that the suit was out of time. In Second Appeal Phillips, J., agreed with the Subordinate judge.

(2.) There is some controversy as to the correct translation of the. relevant portion of the deed. Mr. Lakshmanna for the appellant contends that the proper translation is "from this year Parabhava year included for 16 years". Mr. Rama Rao, on the other side, accepts the version adopted by the Subordinate Judge "from this year to Parabhava inclusive 16 years". The translation in the printed record is "16 years, i. e., from this year till the end of the Telugu year Parabhava". We have had a fourth translation made in this Court and it is "for 16 years from this year to the year Parabhava inclusive". For the purpose of argument we will assume that the third version "16 years from this year till the end of the Telugu year Parabhava" is correct and that the parties to the deed meant it to run for 16 Telugu years. It was, of course, executed several days after the beginning of the Telugu year Khara and, if the lease was to expire at the end of Parabhava, the full term would have been something less than 16 Telugu years. Mr. Lakshmanna takes his stand on Section 25 of the Limitation Act. That section reads as follows: All instruments shall, for the purpose of this Act, be deemed to be made with reference to the Gregorian Calendar.

(3.) Nothing could be more unconditional. if a question of limitation arises, the instrument must be deemed to have been made with reference to the Gregorian Calendar, the intention of the parties being quite immaterial. The rule is an obvious rule of convenience in a country like this, where there are many calendars, each of which divides the year in a different manner. We have been referred to no decision of this Court in which Section 25 of the Limitation Act has been considered. The earliest case cited before us conies from Bombay, Nilkantha v. Daltatraya (1879) ILR 4 B 103. The head-note runs: Where a bond bears a native date only, and is made payable after a certain time, that time, whether denoted by the month or the year, is to be computed according to the Gregorian Calendar. The next is also a Bombay case, Rungo Bujaji V/s. Babaji (1881) ILR 6 B 83. The note was dated Ashad Vadya 13th, Shake 1799, corresponding with 7 August 1877. The stipulation was for payment "in the month Kartik, Shake 1799, that is to say in 4 months" and the suit was filed on 6 December, 1880. If the 4 months period was to be computed with reference to the Indian Calendar the suit was 4 days out of time. With reference to the Gregorian it was in time, although the 6 December, did not fall within the month of Kartik. The High Court agreed that the true construction of the note was that the maker was to pay within 4 lunar months, i. c, in the month of Kartik, but held that Section 25 was absolute and that there was no saving of cases in which it appeared on the face of the contract that lunar months were intended by the parties. This decision was followed by Beverley, J., in Latifunnessa V/s. Dhan Kunwar (1897) ILR 24 C 382. The mortgage bond in question was dated 14 June, 1876 and stipulated that the money should be repaid "in the month of Jeyth 1289 Fasli, being a period of 6 years". The last day of Jeyth 1289 corresponded with the 1 June, 1882, the period of 6 years ended on 14 June, 1882 and the suit was brought on 12 June, 1894. Beverley, J., ruled that the money fell due oh the 14 June, 1882 and that the suit was in time. Ameer Ali, J., doubted the correctness of the ruling, but was not prepared to dissent from it. He thought that the question was one of the intention of the parties and that Section 25 of the Limitation Act did not apply. If, as we think, Section 25 did apply, the question of the intention of the parties was irrelevant.