(1.) THE facts of this case re sufficiently clear from the lower Court's order and I am only concerned ere in the present appeal by Venkat Rao with the question of costs. It has been urged on behalf of the appellant hat costs have been wrongly calculated and that he, in particular, has been saddled with Rs. 505-12-0. It may at nee be stated that the pleader for the respondent has admitted that the inclu ion of the same item of Rs. 5-12-0 in he amount of costs payable by all our applicants was a mistake and the applicant-appellant is only liable for Is. 1-7-0 thereof, viz., a fourth part. The applicant-appellant's case is that, under the orders contained in Judicial commissioner's Circular II-4, P. 8, the fees should have been calculated at one-fourth of the ordinary rates and that thus the applicant-appellant would be liable for one-fourth of Rs. 500, viz., Rs. 125, which, together with Re. 1-7-0 makes a total of Rs. 126-7-0.
(2.) ON behalf of the respondent it has been urged that it is not for the Court to interfere with a discretion which has been duly exercised by the lower Court. I can find no proof, however, that there vas any deliberate or conscious exercise of discretion by the lower Court in the matter. In normal circumstances, the, Court has, under the Civil Procedure Code, a wide discretion in awarding costs, but when a discretion is exercised in the way of allowing greater or less costs than Ate normally applicable to a particular suit, one expects to find mention thereof and of the reasons for passing any special order thereanent in the connected judgment or order I see no reason, therefore, for allowing costs at full rates in the present case, whereas, under the circular order applicable, normal costs at a quarter rate should ordinarily be allowed. The present appeal, therefore, succeeds 'and the lower Court's order as to costs will be modified by the substitution of Rs. 126-7-0 for Rs. 505-12-0 in the amount payable by the appellant Venkat Rao to the Collector.
(3.) I may add that it has been suggested on behalf of the respondent that no appeal lay in connexion with the mere matter of costs such as we are concerned with in the present case, and an old decision Sreemutty Bamasoondaree Dabee v. W. Werner 22 W.R. 136, has been referred to in this connexion. I do not, however, find it necessary to discuss this question for the simple reason that, if no appeal lay, it would have been competent for this Court to entertain the present appeal as an application for revision and there would have been every ground, if any question of limitation arose, for giving the benefit of Section 14, Lim. Act, to the present appellant.