LAWS(PVC)-1927-7-94

BOARD OF CONTROL SRI THYAGARAJA SWAMI DEVASTHANAM, TIRUVALUR REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT S A S R M RAMANATHAM CHETTIAR Vs. BALAJEEAMMAL

Decided On July 29, 1927
BOARD OF CONTROL SRI THYAGARAJA SWAMI DEVASTHANAM, TIRUVALUR REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT S A S R M RAMANATHAM CHETTIAR Appellant
V/S
BALAJEEAMMAL Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an appeal against the order of the Sub Court of Tiruvalur passed on a petition by the President of the Board of Control of Sri Thyagaraja Swami Devasthanam of Tiruvalur. The Board of Control was appointed in pursuance of the scheme framed by this Court in A.S. No. 136 of 1920, on appeal from Order Section No. 52 of 1913, Temporary Sub Court, Tanjore.

(2.) A preliminary objection has been taken by the respondents that no appeal lies The scheme framed by the High Court contains a clause (Clause27) that, any of the parties or the Board of Control as a body or the Advocate-General are at liberty to apply to the Court for any modification of the scheme. But the present application is not an application for any modification of the scheme and does not come under this Clause In the present application the President of the Board of Control complains that some of the Kattalaidars would not send complete budgets of their receipts and expenditure nor would deliver the cash in their hands to the treasurer as provided by cls. 8 and 13 of the scheme and the President applies to the Court for getting the clause enforced, by attachment of the properties or by detention of the recalcitrant defendants. The Subordinate Judge has not given the relief sought by the petitioner. Hence this appeal.

(3.) The respondents in support of their preliminary objection rely on the following cases; Sevak Jeranchod Bhogilal V/s. Dakore Temple Committee , Runganatha Thathachariar V/s. Krishnaswami Thathachariar 75 Ind. Cas. 189 : 47 M. 139 I8 L.W. 237 : (1923) M.W.N. 664 : A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 369, Bara C. Vythalinga Mudaliar V/s. Mahadeva Iyer , Sivan Pillai v. Venkateswara Iyer , Abdul Hakim Baig V/s. Mahomed Burrammuddin and Ryali Brahmayya v. Venkatasurya Narayanamurthy 94 Ind. Cas. 554 : 50 M.L.J. 409 : A.I.R. 1926 Mad. 557. Most of the decisions of the High Court rely on the first of the above decisions which is a decision of the Privy Council. Mr. Varadachariar who appears for the appellant while conceding that most of these other decisions are correctly decided attacked the correctness of the reasoning in the judgment, especially the inference sought to be drawn from the Privy Council decision. It becomes, therefore, necessary, to examine what was exactly decided by the Privy Council and how far the decision supports the inference sought to be drawn from it by Judges of this Court. In that case there was a scheme framed by the Privy Council. The scheme provided for the appointment of a temple committee and empowered the committee to make rules. There is also a provision for the rules being sanctioned or modified by the District Court. There is another clause for the alteration of the scheme by the High Court of Bombay. The committee made the rules and the rules were submitted to the District Court for sanction and the District Judge modified the rules. There was an appeal to the High Court under Section 47, Civil Procedure Code, again at the order of the District Judge; There was also an independent application to the High Court for the alteration of the scheme. But no orders were passed on this application. The High Court, on appeal from the District Court, modified the order of the District Judge. But the Privy Council held that no appeal lay to the High Court under Section 47, Civil Procedure Code, and it should have been rejected. They pointed out that the High Court might have exercised the power conferred on it by the clause which enabled it to modify the scheme. The Privy Council did not say that if the High Court exercised such power that would not have been in execution and no appeal lay against it. They expressed no opinion on the matter. All that they decided was that the order of the District Judge modifying the rules made by the Committee was not an order in execution. S0 far as the alteration of the rules is concerned it cannot be said that anything was sought to be enforced by one party as judgment-creditor against another parr, as judgment debtor who is under some obligation and it cannot be said that there was any question in execution between the two parties, Under the scheme of the Privy Council the rules must be placed before the District Court for its sanction and the District Court has power suo moto to sanction or alter the rules. It is, therefore, doubtful whether the decision of the Privy Council applies to a case where one party who is conferred a certain right by the scheme seeks to enforce the right against some other who is under a corresponding obligation and for this purpose goes to Court It cannot be said that the Privy Council decided that such a matter is not a matter in execution between the parties.