(1.) In my referring judgment I have indicated some of the difficulties which appear to me to exist in construing Section 21 of the Dekkhan Agriculturists Relief Act. But the decisions there cited show that Sir Norman Macleod and Mr. Justice Coyajee in a series of cases have decided that Section 21 exempts from arrest in execution of a money decree any defendant who was an agriculturist at the time of the arrest. I have had the advantage of reading the judgments of my brothers Crump and Patkar which arrive at the game conclusion. The wording admits of that view being taken, and under all the circumstances I am not prepared to dissent from their opinion as to the true construction of the section, although personally I might have arrived at a different conclusion, had I been sitting alone, and the matter had been res integra. But I do so irrespective of the words "passed whether before or after this Act comes into force," which were added by Section 8 of Act XXII of 1882. These words were, I think, only added to make the Act retrospective, as is the case with Section 20, and thus to avoid the decision of the Full Bench in Dipchand V/s. Gokaldas (1880) I.L.R. 4 Bom. 363, F.B.
(2.) In holding, however, in answer to the first question, that the material date for the determination of the status of an agriculturist under Section 21 is the date of the attempted arrest, the definition in Sub-sections 1 and 2 of Section 2 of the Act must be borne in mind. Consequently, under Sub-section 2 a defendant, who was an agriculturist, "when any part of the liability which forms the subject of the suit or proceeding was incurred," will be exempt from arrest, even though at the date of the arrest he may not be an agriculturist within the meaning of Sub-section 1 standing by itself.
(3.) It follows that, on the above construction of Section 21, the second question should be answered in the affirmative. It is sufficient for a defendant to be an agriculturist at the date of the arrest, irrespective of whether he was an agriculturist at the date of the decree. Consequently, it is unnecessary to consider whether that decree was ex parte or otherwise. I accordingly confine my judgment to Section 21, and give no opinion on the cases on Section 20 or Section 15B.