(1.) The two appellants were charged with offences under Secs.295, 297 and 436, I.P.C. They were found guilty by a majority of 3:2 of the jury of offences under the first two sections. They have been found not guilty by the unanimous verdict of the jury of the offence under Section 436. The objections taken in regard to the trial are : firstly, that the procedure in empannelling the jury was illegal ; secondly, that the learned Judge did not point out to the jury that in regard to circumstantial evidence, it is necessary that the jury should find that the circumstances placed before them are not consistent with the innocence of the accused; thirdly, it has been pointed out that the learned Judge has misdirected the jury with regard to the statement of one of the witnesses to the effect that the culprits had not been recognized at the time of the occurrence; and lastly, it has been pointed out that the learned Judge is wrong in stating to the jury that there is a presumption of law that the witness who has spoken untruth must be believed in so far as they depose to facts spoken to by other witnesses.
(2.) In regard to the first matter what happened is this : Out of 12 jurors summoned only two were in attendance. The learned Judge sent for three of the professors from the local college, and when objection was taken to the sitting of one of them as a juror, he sent for another professor of the same college to fill up the vacancy in the jury. This procedure is not justified by the provisions of Sec. 276, Criminal P.C. Proviso 2 to that section provides that in case of a deficiency in the required number of jurors, the Court may empannel other persons present in Court to fill up the vacancy in the jury. There has been illegality in regard to the empannelling of the jury and this] illegality has vitiated the trial.
(3.) The second objection is also good. The learned Judge has not put it to the jury that when a case is based on circumstantial evidence, the circumstances should be such that there can be no reasonable possibility of the innocence of the accused.