MT MURADAN Vs. RAGHUNANDAN PRASAD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Mt. Muradan brought a suit, as amended, for a declaration that she has an ex- proprietary right in respect of the lands specified and that the plaintiff's registered deed of relinquishment, dated the 19 January 1918 is forged and is null and void and ineffectual as against her. The facts are that the plaintiff was an ex- proprietary tenant, together with certain relatives, of 86 bighas odd of land. She and these other relatives executed a usufructuary mortgage. Subsequently some of the relatives; entered into an arrangement with the zamindar by which he agreed to discharge the mortgage and in return therefor these relatives executed in his favour on the 19 January 1918, a deed of relinquishment of 70 bighas of the land which purported to be executed by the plaintiff and all the relatives. To this extent the transaction would appear to have been to the benefit of the plaintiff in that she and her family recovered unencumbered possession of 16 bighas odd. The plaintiff alleges that she was no party to the deed of relinquishment at all and that so far as her name at any rate was concerned it was forgery. It has been found by both Courts that her allegation of forgery was well founded, and the trial Court gave her a decree for all the reliefs which she sought. On appeal the lower appellate Court, while agreeing with the trial Court that the document was a forgery in so far as the plaintiff's name was concerned and that, the plaintiff would ordinarily be entitled to be declared an ex-proprietary tenant of the whole 86 bighas, dismissed the suit as barred by limitation under Art 92, Limitation Act.

(2.) The deed of relinquishment was dated 19 January 1918, and the suit was filed on the 24 June 1923. Therefore, if Art, 92 was properly applicable and governed the whole of the reliefs asked for, the suit was properly dismissed. The plaintiff, who was a pardanashin lady, does not appear to have wholly slept upon her rights, but she or her advisers, did not know how to proceed and they wasted some considerable time in making applications to the District Judge and the Collector. It was urged below that she was entitled to the benefit of the time occupied in these proceedings. But that contention has not been repeated before us, and it is clear that if Art. 92 governs the whole of the relief which she sought, the suit was barred. On behalf of the appellant we have been referred to the case of Jagardeo Singh V/s. Phuljhari [1908] 30 All. 375 and the case of Mi San Ma Khaing V/s. Shwe Ba A.I.R. 1923 Rang. 82. Upon the view that we take we do not consider it necessary to consider these cases in detail. This was, so far as the relief concerning the document which we have set out above is concerned, in terms a suit for a declaration that the registered document was forged and as such relief clearly comes within Art. 92, Limitation Act, and the suit having been brought after the lapse of three years, the relief was barred by limitation.

(3.) The next question is whether the relief asking for a declaration that the document was forged was to such an extent the principal relief that any other relief was merely so subsidiary that the whole suit must be regarded as barred.