ELEDATH THAVAZHI, KARNAVAN AND MANAGER KUNHUNNI MENON Vs. ELIANGATTIL SANKARA VALIA RAJAH AVARGAL, STYLED VANNILASSERI UTAYA KANDAN THEVA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The 2nd defendant obtained a kanom from the plaintiff s Tarwad in 1860. There was a decree for redemption against him; after decree and before restoring possession, he assigned his rights to the grandmother of the 1st defendant by Exhibit VIII. Subsequently, the 1st defendant s grandmother obtained a kanom in 1888 from the plaintiff s Tarwad which was renewed, in 1899. The 2nd defendant took on lease the properties included in these demises from the 1st defendant, Exhibit XXX. Plaintiff sues to redeem the kanom. The 2nd defendant contended that the lands in suit were not included in the demise sued on. The Subordinate Judge has found after full discussion that they were included, and we see no reason to differ from him.

(2.) The learned Vakil for the appellant next contended that the lease under which he was holding was determined by the Government granting him a patta for the lands in 1893 and as he has been holding the lands under the Government, since then without paying any rent to the 1st defendant or the plaintiff s Tarwad, he had acquired a title to them by adverse possession.

(3.) The case strongly relied on by him for this proposition is Subbaraya v. Krishnappa 12 M. 422 : 4 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 643. But an examination of the facts of the case shows that that decision lends no support to the appellant. In that case, the 1st plaintiff and the 1st defendant were adjoining landowners, the former being an old wargdar and the latter a person to whom a warg patta was newly granted. The land in question was Government waste land situated near the two wargs. The plaintiff, under the impression that the waste land would be granted to him by the Government, allowed the 2nd plaintiff to take them on lease from him. The 2nd plaintiff assigned that lease to the 2nd defendant. The Government, however, did not grant a patta to the 1st plaintiff, but gave the lands to the 1st defendant. The 2nd defendant contended that this action of the Government put an end to his tenancy from the 1st plaintiff; and the Court upheld that contention. It was apparently conceded by the contending parties that the lessor and the lessee did not deal with the property in the belief that the lessor had a right to grant a lease. The lease was accepted on the footing that the right to the land would be granted subsequently by the Government. When that understanding between the parties was not realised, the 2nd, defendant was-held entitled to repudiate the relationship of landlord and tenant. We are, therefore, of opinion that that decision is no authority for the broad proposition that an interference by a third party, whether that party be the Government or some other rival claimant, can have the effect of determining the relationship originally created between the landlord and the tenant. The next case relied on was Hattikudur Narain Rao v. Andar Sayad Abbas Sahib 27 Ind. Cas. 785 : 28 M.L.J. 44. Mr. Justice Hannay seems to have held that Subbaraya v. Krishnappa 12 M. 422 : 4 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 643 was authority for the theory that a declaration by the Government can sever the relationship of a tenant to the landlord under whom he held properties. In our opinion, the learned Judge has stated the inference from the earlier case too broadly. As regards Ammu v. Ramakrishna Sastri 2 M. 226 at pp. 229, 280 : 1 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 429, we are clear that the statement the tenancy under which the appellant held the plot of which she is now in possession was determined when the Deputy Collector declared the land to be the property of Government and granted it to the appellant as a ryot of the Government, and thereafter the appellant was not estopped from contending that the interest of the former landlord had expired see Ammu v. Ramakrishna Sastri 2 M. 226 at pp. 229, 280 : 1 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 429. does not enunciate the law correctly.