RAPAKA VIYYANNA Vs. PARAKALA BAJAMMA ALIAS SESHAMMA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) UNDER Section 27 of the Civil Courts Act, the general control over all Civil Courts in any District is vested in the District Judge and the latter is, therefore, an authority to which the Court of a Subordinate Judge is subordinate within the meaning of the Criminal Procedure Code, Section 195 (6). The High Court has general powers of superintendence over all Courts and is a similar authority. Sub-section (7) of that section deals with the case of several controlling authorities and provides that only the Court to which appeals ordinarily lie from the Court granting sanction shall exercise the power conferred by Sub-section (6). Sub-section 7 (a) also provides that where such appeals lie to more than one Court the Appellate Court of inferior jurisdiction shall be the authority to exercise this power. Appeals lie from the Court of a Subordinate Judge in certain cases to the District Judge and in other oases to the. High Court, and Section 13 of the Civil Courts Act treats the latter class of cases as an exception to the general rule that appeals lie to the District Judge. Since appeals ordinarily lie to the District Court and the latter is of inferior jurisdiction to the High Court, the District Court is the authority to which the Court of the Subordinate Judge is subordinate within the meaning of Sub-section (6).

(2.) IT is contended by Mr. Ramadoss that in this case the Subordinate Judge passed the order in the, exercise of his appellate jurisdiction and that appeals lie from orders so passed only to the High Court under Section 100 of the Civil Procedure Code. Section 195 of the Criminal Procedure Code, however, only refers to Courts and makes no distinction between appellate and original jurisdiction, and in Muthuswami Mudali v. Veeni Chetti 30 M. 382 : 17 M.L.J. 266 : 2 M.T. 239 : 6 Cr.L.J. 102 (F.B.) it was held that an order of a Superior Court passed under Section 195 was not merely an order confirming or reversing the order of a Subordinate Court, but was itself an order granting or refusing sanction. If it were treated as a mere appellate order, Section 195 makes no provision for further applications and it is only by treating the order as an original order that any further application lies under Section 195. We, therefore, think that this application should have been made to the District Court and accordingly dismiss it.