MATUKDHARI SINGH Vs. JAISRI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Babu Anrudh Lal Mahendra, a Magistrate of the first class at Mirzapur, was satisfied from a police report that a dispute likely to cause a breach of the peace existed concerning certain lands situate in Jafar Khani within the local limits of his jurisdiction. He made an Order In writing, No. 3A on the record, stating the ground of his being so satisfied and requiring the parties concerned in the dispute to attend his court on the 25th of September, 1916, and to put in written statements of their respective claims stating the fact of the actual possession of the subject of dispute, It has not been suggested that the order was not properly served as required by law, and it may be taken therefore that the notices were originally issued in respect of about 4 bighas 19 biswas of land in Jafar Khani; but the Magistrate, on reading the written statement and petitions of Matukdhari Singh, came to the conclusion that the dispute really existed about 19 bighas of land in Sherwa as well as about the land in Jafar Khani. The parties consented (vide paper No. 9A on the record) that an inquiry should be held in respect of both the lands in Sherwa and in Jafar Khani. After considering the evidence produced by both the parties, the learned Magistrate decided that Jaisri was in possession at the date on which he issued his order of the 8th of September, 1916, and he issued an order declaring Jaisri to be entitled to possession thereof until evicted therefrom in due course of law [and forbidding all disturbance of his possession until such eviction (vide his order, dated the 7th of December, 1916).

(2.) The opposite party Matukdhari Singh is now asking this Court to interfere in revision with the order of the 7th of December, 1916, on the grounds that the learned Magistrate had no jurisdiction to entertain a proceeding under Section 145 under the circumstances of the case; that the learned Magistrate error in giving possession of the whole holding to Jaisri, and that the learned Magistrate had not decided the question of possession, which was with the applicant. So far as can be judged from the record, which was seat for, the proceedings of the learned Magistrate were proceedings carefully and Specifically taken under Chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Nothing was shown in the application to this Court which threw doubt upon this procedure, and I am inclined to doubt whether this Court had any power to send for these proceedings and to inquire into them.

(3.) In Jhingai Singh v. Bam Partap (1908) I.L.R. 31 All. 150 it was held, following Maharaj Tewari v. Har Charan Rai (1903) I.L.R. 26 All. 144, that as the law at present stands, where the proceedings below are in intention, in form and in fact proceedings under Chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure by a Magistrate duly empowered to act under that Chapter, this Court has no power to send for those proceedings either under the Code or under Section 15 of the Indian High Courts Act of 1861." The court refused to go into the question where, after being properly seised of the case, the learned Magistrate went out of his way and passed an order which he had no jurisdiction to pass. In Maharaj Tewari v. Har Charan Rai (1903) I.L.R. 26 All. 144 a Division Bench of this Court held that when a Magistrate having jurisdiction in this behalf with great care and precision laid the proper foundation for his proceedings under Chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, then, by the amendment which was introduced by the Code of Criminal Procedure (1898) into Section 435, this Court had no power to call for record of these proceedings. An attempt was made to contend that this Court could under Section 15 of the Charter Act and the powers of superintendence thereby given set aside the order of the Magistrate passed under Chapter XII of the Code of Criminal Procedure. This Court declined to do so, inasmuch as it found that the jurisdiction given to it under Clause 29 of the Letters Patent contained the express provision "that the proceedings in all criminal cases other than those brought before this Court in the exercise of its ordinary original criminal jurisdiction shall be regulated by the Code of Criminal Procedure or by such further and other laws in relation to the Code of Criminal Procedure as may have been or may be made by the Governor General in Council" (see page 147). Another Division Bench of this Court in Sayeda Khatun v. Lal Singh (1914) I.L.R. 36 All. 233 followed the cases just quoted above and entirely agreed with the view expressed in those cases. The case of Babban Singh v. Baldeo Singh (1906) 4 A.L.J. 91 is also a case in point upon this question, in which it was laid down that once it was established that a Magistrate had acted with jurisdiction this Court had no further concern with the matter. The remarks of the present learned Chief Justice in Har Prasad v. Pandurang Weekly Notes 1905 p. 260 are very important, He held that it would be a matter of great regret if on purely technical grounds the spirit and intention of the Code of Criminal Procedure be ignored. See also Baldeo Bakah Singh v. Raj Ballam Singh (1905) 2 A.L.J. 274.