CHANDI CHARAN GIRL Vs. GADADHAR PRODHAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) In this case the petitioners Chandi Charan Giri and Gajendra Barik applied to the Sub- Divisional Officer of Contai, exercising the powers of a Collector, for appraisement of produce under Section 69 of the Bengal Tenancy Act. In those proceedings the officer deputed to hold a local enquiry reported that the petitioners bad made use of forged receipts. On this report the Sub-Divisional Officer refused their application, and at the instance of their opponents granted sanction for their prosecution under Sections 471 and 209, Indian Penal Code. From that order the petitioners appealed to the Commissioner of the Burdwan Division. The Commissioner held that he had no jurisdiction and that the Court to which the Sub-Divisional Officer s Court was subordinate was that of the District Judge of Midnapore under Section 195 (7) (c) of the Criminal Procedure Code. The petitioners then applied to the District Judge, but he threw out their application on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to entertain it. He was of opinion that the Commissioner s Court had jurisdiction, as the Court to which appeals from the decisions of a Collector or officer exercising the powers of a Collector under the Bengal Tenancy Act would ordinarily lie. Against the District Judge s order the petitioners applied to this Court to exercise its revisional powers, and this Rule was issued. It should be noted that in proceedings under Section 69 of the Bengal Tenancy Act by Section 70 (5) "the Collector may, if he thinks fit, refer any question in dispute between the parties for the decision of a Civil Court, but subject as aforesaid his order shall be final and shall on application to a Civil Court by the landlord or the tenant be enforceable as a decree." There is consequently no appeal from an order of the Collector under Section 70.

(2.) The Collector acting under Sections 69 and 70 is a "Court" within the meaning of Section 195, Criminal Procedure Code [see Raghoobuns Sahoy v. Kokil Singh 17 C. 872 : 8 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 1126. The question is to what authority he is to be regarded as subordinate for the purposes of Section 195 (6). Section 195 (7) purports to supply the answer, but it is so unfortunately worded as to leave the enquirer in much the same doubt and uncertainty as he was before- The difficulty of interpretation will be apparent if Clauses (a) and (6) be omitted. Section 195 (7) will then read: "For the purposes of this section every Court shall be deemed to be subordinate only to the Court to which appeals from the former Court ordinarily lie, that is to say, (c) where no appeal lies such Court shall be deemed to be subordinate to the principal Court of original jurisdiction within the local limits of whose jurisdiction such first mentioned Court is situate." The difficulty seems to have arisen from the attempt to provide in one clause for oases where an appeal lies as well as for those where no appeal lies.

(3.) No doubt the words where no appeal lies" are wide enough to cover oases, where all decisions of a particular Court are made final by law, e. g., a Small Cause Court, and also cases where a particular order is non-appealable, e. g, the case before us. I am inclined to think that the former class of cases only was referred to by the Legislature in this Section 195 (7). If it were not so, the word ordinarily" in the earlier part of the sub-section would be meaningless. Further, there does not seem to be any good reason for possibly transferring jurisdiction from a Court of one class to a Court of another, simply because an appeal from the particular order in question is forbidden. Nor am I prepared to say that the principal Court of original jurisdiction must necessarily refer to a Court of any particular class. It is a Civil or Criminal or Revenue Court, as the case may be.