APPALA RAJA Vs. RANGAPPA NAICKER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is an application by the plaintiffs (who were respondents before us in S.A. No. 1198 of 1914) for leave to appeal to the Privy Council against the judgment of this Court which reversed the decision of the Subordinate Judge of Sivaganga and dismissed the plaintiffs suit. The application for leave is based on the ground that the decree of this Court relates to a subject-matter whose value was Rs. 10,000 or upwards in the Court of first instance and the subject-matter in dispute on appeal to His Majesty in Council is also of the same value and that therefore the application fulfils the requirements of the first paragraph of Section 110, Civil Procedure Code. It is further alleged that the decree involves directly or indirectly some claim or question to or respecting property of like amount or value and hence it further or in the alternative, satisfies the requirements of the second paragraph of Section 110. Civil Procedure Code. It is finally contended that even if neither of the above requirements is fulfilled, the application satisfies the conditions of paragraph 3 of Section 110, Civil Procedure Code namely, that there is a substantial question of law involved in the suit on which it is advisable that there should be a pronouncement by their Lordships of the Privy Council.

(2.) It may be remarked that in the plaint, the subject matter in dispute in the suit is valued at Rs. 300 for purposes of jurisdiction. The Court-fee paid on the plaint is Es. 11-8-0 which would cover a subject matter of a value of about one hundred and forty rupees only. No doubt, the value for the purpose of calculation of court-fees and the value fixed for the purpose of jurisdiction in respect of claims for declarations and injunctions do not afford in all cases the proper criteria for finding out the value of the subject-matter in dispute for purposes of ascertaining whether the requirements of the first paragraph of Section 110 are satisfied. Now the subject matter in dispute, in this case is the right of the plaintiffs to have the water of the Thalaigidanga pond and of the channel B for the irrigation of their fields. The real value of that right can be properly ascertained only on the basis of the detriment or injury which the plaintiffs would suffer if that fight is negatives as it has been. The affidavit in support of the application for leave mentions in paragraphs 14, 15 and 16 that the plaintiffs have suffered (either by the decreased value of the lands or by the decrease of the annual average income) an injury of which the pecuniary equivalent amounted to very much more than Rs. 10,000. But the finding of the District Munsif (to whom this question was referred by this Court for his opinion which we accept) is that the actual detriment or injury caused to the plaintiffs does not amount to Rs. 10,000 and is negligible so far as pecuniary value is concerned. It seems to me therefore that so far as the first paragraph of Section 110 is concerned, this case does not fulfil the requirements thereof.

(3.) Then Mr. Venkatarama Sastriar argued that the requirements of the second paragraph are fulfilled because though the subject-matter of the suit and the subject-matter in dispute on appeal to His Majesty in Council may be less than Rs. 10,000 in value, the decree of this Court involves a claim " respecting" irrigation of lands which lands are worth more than a lakh of rupees. If the word property in the second paragraph of Section 110 be given the widest meaning, and if the word respecting is also given a very wide interpretation, the above argument has no doubt much force. But in construing the word property in the second paragraph, we cannot lose sight of the first paragraph of Section 110 to which the second is an alternative. I think property in the second paragraph of Section 110 means rights in property inferior to full ownership where such inferior rights alone are the subject-matter in dispute. Hence the second paragraph means that the suit must, to satisfy its conditions, involve rights and claims to property which rights and claims are worth Rs. 10,000 an I upwards. I am fortified in this view by the decision of Sir Lawrence Jenkins, C.J., and Mr. Justice Russel in De Silva v. De Silva (1907) 6 Bom. L.R 103 at p. 406. The case in Ajnas Kooer v. Luteefa (1873) 18 W.R. 21 also lends support to this view as being the only reasonable view of the law on this point. No doubt, the provisions of the second paragraph of Section 110 had not been enacted on the date of that decision but I think the second paragraph only intended to extend the privilege given by the first paragraph (in so far as it enabled an appeal to be filed even though the dispute directly involved in the litigation sought to be taken up to the Privy Council was less than Rs. 10,000) only to cases where a claim regarding rights of Rs. 10,000 or upwards in value is involved indirectly, though not directly. Whether directly or indirectly involved, on the question however, as to what is the thing which should be Rs. 10,000 or upwards in value so as to justify an appeal to the Privy Council, I think that the case in Ajnas Kooer v. Luteefa (1872) 18 W.R. 21 furnishes an authority which is entitled to great respect.